In January 2012, New York Times Pulitzer Prize winning reporter Christopher Hedges filed a federal lawsuit against President Obama, challenging detention provisions in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of Fiscal Year 2012.
The Act authorized $662 billion in funding, “for defense of the United States and it’s interests abroad.” Central to Hedges’ suit, a controversial provision set forth in subsection 1021 of Title X, Sub-title (d) entitled “Counter-Terrorism,” authorizing indefinite military detention of individuals the government suspects are involved in terrorism, including U.S. citizens arrested on American soil.
Over the last two years, a broad coalition including the Tenth Amendment Center, the American Civil Liberties Union, the Bill of Rights Defense Committee, and many others formed in opposition to indefinite detention provisions, concerned with over-broad language open to wide interpretation and the growing scope of presidential authority. In support of Hedges, many of these individuals and organizations joined together as an Amicus Curiae, otherwise known as a Friend of the Court. The coalition filed an Amicus Brief supporting Hedges’ interpretation of the controversial issues abounding in Hedges v. Obama. The Amicus Curiae states, “Each entity is dedicated, inter alia (among other things), to the correct construction, interpretation, and application of the law.”
For those not familiar with an Amicus Brief, it is a document filed with a court by a person or group not directly involved in the case. The brief often contains information useful to a judge when evaluating the merits of a case and it becomes part of the official record. In addition to filing a brief, Amicus Curiae can involve itself in a case in many ways. It can contribute academic evaluations of subject matters, it can testify in a case, and on rare cases it can help contribute to oral arguments. Many times, state and local governments also join a case as a “Friend” if they believe it will impact them. This happened in Hedges v. Obama. A large number of concerned individuals and advocacy organizations enjoined the case as Amicus Curiae.
The Amicus Brief of this case commences by focusing on the ambiguity of the language in section 1021 of the 2012 NDAA.
“Rarely has a short statute been subject to more radically different interpretations than Section 1021 of the NDAA of 2012.”
The “Friends” contend the verbiage offers diametrically opposite meanings.
”The Framers would be greatly shocked to hear the United States assert that an American President has power to place civilians in the U.S. or citizens abroad into military custody absent status as armed combatants. No President has ever held such power.”
As the Amicus Curiae implies, the language of this law is dangerously vague. Many believe the provisions of Section 1021 grant dictatorial powers to the federal government to arrest any American citizen without a warrant and indefinitely detain them without charge. Detainees can be shipped to the military’s offshore prisons and kept there until “the end of hostilities.”
Section 1021 defines a “covered person” as “one subject to detention” and “a person who was part of or substantially supported al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces engaged in hostilities against the United States or it’s coalition partners, including any person who has committed a belligerent act or has directly supported such hostilities in aid of such enemy forces.” However, the law does not define “substantially supported” or “associated forces,” leaving those nebulous terms open to interpretation.
The White House and Senate sponsors maintain the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) previously granted presidential authority for indefinite detention. In their Appellant Brief, the Department of Justice contends that the NDAA does no more than “explicitly reaffirm…the President’s detention authority under AUMF,” a Congressional Joint Resolution passed Sept. 14, 2001.
In response to this claim, the plaintiffs’ Coalition rebuts, “If the Government’s theory was true, then the U.S. Senate spent weeks debating and enacting, and the U.S. Department of Justice has worked mightily to uphold a meaningless and unnecessary statute.”
The Amicus Curiae addresses a second issue.
“The Legislative History of the NDAA Reveals a Gap between the Clear Purpose and the Ambiguous Statutory Language. The NDAA detention provisions, and one amendment which was adopted creating subsection (e), were not drafted in haste. Rather, the legislative history suggests another reason for the stark difference of statutory interpretation.”
This section continues, contrasting the original Senate bill (S. 1253) that included limiting language excluding the ability of the government to detain citizens of the United States under the act and the final version of the NDAA. This limiting language was deleted in a substitute bill (S. 1867), by Senator Carl Levin (D-MI). The record shows that this limiting language was removed at the request of the president in order to keep the law consistent with the AUMF of 2001.
This fact stands in stark contrast to public statements made by Pres. Obama on the detention issue, including his signing statement.
“I want to clarify, that my Administration will not authorize the indefinite detention without trial of American citizens…My Administration will interpret section 1021 in a manner that ensures that any detention it authorizes complies with the Constitution, the laws of war, and all other applicable law.”
However in May 2012, Judge Katherine Forrest, (an Obama-appointed judge) ruled part of section 1021 unconstitutional.
“The plaintiffs do have standing, and that section 1021 is facially unconstitutional.”
In her ruling, Forrest asserted that the provision denies First and Fifth Amendment rights, and she granted a temporary restraining order against Section 1021 of the NDAA. The government responded by requesting that the judge reverse her ruling, claiming the plaintiffs did not have standing to bring the case against the government because they had yet to be indefinitely detained. And the administration argued that even if Mr. Hedges and the other plaintiffs did have standing, they were the only seven American citizens covered by the temporary restraining order.
In spite of the administration’s arguments, Judge Forrest returned a clarifying order, making it abundantly clear, without any equivocation, that the temporary restraining order applied to ALL American citizens. According to the judge, the government cannot indefinitely detain any American citizen without access to due process.
In September 2012, Judge Forrest issued a permanent injunction against indefinite detention of American citizens, but the Obama administration appealed and was granted a stay pending that appeal.
The next consequential argument forwarded in the Amicus Brief is that the 2001 AUMF is not a Constitutional Declaration of War.
“The Government misunderstands the Constitution which was written for a time of war, as well as a time of peace. There is only one provision in the Constitution which can be suspended in wartime conditions: the writ of habeus corpus, and that suspension requires an act of Congress. U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 9. And there is only one wartime exception, that being the right to a Grand Jury indictment as set forth in the Fifth Amendment. The war power does not trump the rights and protections of the people in any other instances.”
“The Government’s sole support in attempt to sweep aside the Constitution’s Bill of Rights, is the Congressional declaration of war against the Imperial Department of Japan in World War II (Govt. Br., p.47), which the Government claims to have been: -stated in broadest terms, with no precise descriptions of who may be the subject of force (including detention) or under what circumstances, and without any express carve-outs for arguably protected speech. This pattern holds for every authorization for the use of military force in our nation’s history-including the AUMF.'”
Rather than offering support for the Government’s claim, the differences between the 2001 and 1941 declarations undermine it.
In contrast the AUMF provides: “that the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations or persons he determines planned,authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.” [Pub. L. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (Sept. 18, 2001)§ 2(a)
The first and most obvious difference between the two resolutions is that the U.S. actually declared war against Japan. Even though the Government argues the Constitution “imposes no constraints on how the declaration should be worded, Congress has never been at a loss for words when declaring war from 1812 to 1941.’”
Secondly, the 1941 declaration “authorizes and directs” the President to take action, while the 2001 AUMF merely leaves it to the President’s discretion to “determine” the force necessary.
“In 1941, Congress instructed the President to use all of the nation’s military force and government resources to carry on war against a clearly identified enemy, while the 2001 AUMF empowered the President to identify the enemy.”
Lastly, the 1941 declaration specified a time when the president’s authority ended, when the war was successfully terminated, while the AUMF set no definite time for the president’s power to cease. In the wake of 9/11, Congressman Ron Paul implored Congress to address the war declaration issue, but found little interest in the constitutional process.
“As the Apellees have demonstrated, the Constitution does not confer upon the President or upon Congress any power to subject civilians to detention by the military as AUMF and Section 1021 (b)(2) do, even if the nation is at war.”
Access to habeus corpus is “not a satisfactory remedy to the burden of military detention” for a citizen who is suspected of “substantially supporting a force associated with any enemy, al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or otherwise.” Not only is habeas relief unsatisfactory, imposing upon an American citizen the burden of seeking habeas relief to escape from military detention is constitutionally impermissible under the Treason Clause of Article III, Section 3. In Federalist No. 43, James Madison asserted that the Treason Clause must be understood as one of the enumerated powers of the federal government, placing severe limits on the legislative power not only to define the elements of treason, but to preclude Congress from evading the constitutional definition of treason by “new-fangled and artificial” definitions.
Lastly, the Amicus Brief discusses the judicial branche’s duty to address constitutional issues in the case asserted by many states.
After the enactment of the NDAA of 2012, many state and local officials expressed opposition to the constitutional violations perceived in Section 1021. State legislators and local officials have taken different approaches in battling this unconstitutional overreach. Some states have passed non-binding resolutions, while others like Virginia and Alaska have enacted laws nullifying Section 1021 by “barring any state agency or political subdivision or employee or National Guard from knowingly aiding an agency of the armed forces of the United States in the unlawful NDAA detention of any citizen…”
“These efforts do not break new ground, they build on lessons learned since the beginning of the Republic. When the federal government breeches the bounds of its authority, the nation’s sovereign states can be expected to respond to protect the liberties of the people.” As Chief Justice John Marshall observed, “vesting such power in the courts requires a judge to look into the Constitution, examining it’s text to determine whether actions of the two other branches conform to the written instrument.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178-79 (1803).
“In this case, the executive branch is arguing on behalf of the legislative branch that the judicial branch may not even look into the Constitution to determine if Section 1021 (b) (2) violates First and Fifth Amendments. As Chief Justice John Marshall responded in Marbury, the Government’s claim is too extravagant to be maintained.”
The appeals process continues and the case is expected to ultimately be heard by the Supreme Court. If the Plaintiff and it’s coalition are correct, then the district court’s conclusion that, “Section 1021(b)(2), and its companion subsections (d) and (e), differ materially from AUMF, creating a reasonable and objective fear of detention , and should be affirmed” as Unconstitutional.
See All Trial Documents Here: https://www.stopndaa.org/aboutlawsuit/
Legislation for your state or local community to reject and nullify indefinite detention: http://tenthamendmentcenter.com/ndaa
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