The United States Constitution, as the Obama Regime pretends to understand it, is a most peculiar document, one that is actually enhanced by the criminal actions of public officials who brazenly violate its most explicit provisions. Most people would assume that such actions would tarnish the Constitution. As the administration tells it, however, decades of persistent presidential contempt for the Constitution have conferred an “historical gloss” on the document, just as decades of determined obfuscation of its unambiguous and easily understood war powers provisions have “clarified” their meaning.

Caroline D. Krass, a minor functionary in the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel, was assigned to play the role of the Obama administration’s John Yoo — that is, the sophist responsible for composing a spurious but serviceable legal rationale for the exercise of dictatorial powers by the president. The resulting memo — dated, appropriately, April 1 — claims that Obama needed no congressional authorization of any kind to commit aggressive war against Libya, since in his holy and indisputable judgment the possibility of “regional instability” and injury to the “credibility and effectiveness of the United Nations Security Council” posed threats to our national security that demanded a military response. Accordingly, Krass concluded, Obama could initiate war with Libya “as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive and pursuant to his foreign affairs powers … even without prior specific congressional approval.’

The actual text of the Constitution, and the well-articulated intent of the Framers to deny the president unilateral powers of this kind, are inconsequential, according to Krass, who cites an earlier OLC opinion claiming that a “pattern of executive conduct, made under claim of right, extended over many decades and engaged in by Presidents of both parties, evidences the existence of broad constitutional power.” It does no such thing, of course, any more than the persistence of armed robbery in defiance of laws against theft “evidences the existence of a broad right to steal property at gunpoint” (which is, of course, the defining activity of the institutionalized affliction called “government”).

Krass’s memo does offer a pretty detailed description of the devious dialectic in which presidents have usurped war powers, and congress has abdicated its authority, yielding the present post-constitutional synthesis in which any elected dictator can wage war anywhere for as long as he or she pleases. The only “possible constitutionally-based limit” on the president’s supposed authority to wage war, she insists, would involve “a planned military engagement that constitutes a `war’ within the meaning of the Declaration of War Clause….” This is to say that from the Regime’s perspective, there is a vague, and not terribly important, possibility that the Declaration of War Clause might actually impose a hypothetical limit on presidential war powers. However, the memo goes on to assert that “the historical practice of even intensive military action [such as] … some two months of bombing in Yugoslavia in 1999 — without specific prior congressional approval” effectively nullifies that constitutional limitation.

The compelling “national interest” claimed in the OLC memo is two-fold: First, preventing a “humanitarian catastrophe” that “could” have ensued in Benghazi (a claim that was as much a cynical fiction as Bill Clinton’s lie that hundreds of thousands of Kosovo Albanians were facing annihilation, or the Bush administration’s fabrications about Saddam’s WMD); and second, “maintaining the credibility of the United Nations Security Council and the effectiveness of its actions to promote international peace and security.” Both of those objectives are best served, we are supposed to believe, by flinging Tomahawk cruise missiles at population centers in  a country that posed no threat to us.

Of particular interest in this connection is Krass’s statement that “the United States government has recognized that `[t]he continued existence of the United Nations as an effective international organization is a paramount United States interest.’” That phrase, which was cited by the first Bush administration to justify the UN-”authorized” December 1992 invasion of Somalia, originated in a 1950 State Department Bulletin entitled Authority of the President to Repel the Attack in Korea. The term “paramount,” of course, is a synonym for “supreme”; this means that Krass and her predecessors defined preservation of the UN as the supreme foreign policy interest of the United States government.

As was recently pointed out in LRC,  the United Nations was never intended to be a peace organization. From the beginning, as Simon Tisdall of theGuardian of London observes, the UN’s “primary purpose was as a war-fighting machine.” When Congress enacted the United Nations Participation Act in December 1945, it effectively repudiated its constitutional role in declaring war, deferring instead to a new arrangement in which the president can deploy troops anywhere in the world in compliance with our supposed “obligations” to the UN and the international system it administers.

Granted, the UN war-making  system hasn’t operated in strict accordance with its charter — but this is just another case in which the text of a supposedly binding document has been transcended by the “historical gloss” placed on it by policymakers who recognize no limits on the powers they exercise. Whenever such people find their ambitions constricted by the terms of a constitution or charter, they will simply write themselves an elaborate permission slip — festooned with specious citations — authorizing them to do whatever they damn well please.

William Norman Grigg [send him mail] publishes the Pro Libertate blog and hosts the Pro Libertate radio program.

Copyright © 2011 William Norman Grigg

You can sympathize with the humanitarian motives of our Libyan intervention while still doubting its constitutionality.

The Constitution prescribes the rules about how the United States is to enter a war, and the Obama administration has violated those rules.

The administration argues that the hostilities, because limited, do not rise to the level of “war,” as the Constitution uses that word.  But that position is almost surely wrong: Founding-Era dictionaries and other sources, both legal and lay, tell us that when the Constitution was approved, “war” consisted of any hostilities initiated by a sovereign over opposition.  A very typical dictionary definition was, “the exercise of violence under sovereign command against such as oppose.”  (Barlow, 1772-73).  I have found no suggestion in any contemporaneous source that operations of the kind the U.S. is conducting were anything but “war.”

The Founders’ favorite authority on international law, Vattel, divided wars into three principal categories: defensive wars, offensive just wars, and offensive unjust wars. A nation fought a defensive war when it responded to an invasion.  It fought a just offensive war when it responded to an infringement of its rights short of invasion.  It fought an unjust offensive war if it attacked another country even though that other country had not infringed its rights.  Examples of unjust offensive wars were those fought for conquest or to limit an innocent neighbor’s power.

A defensive war did not require a declaration.  A just offensive war did require one, although it might be called something other than “declaration of war.”  The declaration triggered certain consequences under international law, but Vattel says its principal purpose was to give the other country a last chance to correct the injury it was inflicting.  Because unjust wars were those launched by a country that had not suffered legal injury, it follows that “declarations of war” issued by an aggressor were at least partially defective.

Now: The federal government has only those powers the Constitution grants it.  The Constitution grants the federal government authority to begin and wage a defensive war: “The United States shall . . . protect each [state] against Invasion” (IV-4).  (Protection of U.S. territories is impliedly authorized as well: IV-3-2) But the Constitution grants only Congressauthority to initiate a just offensive war€”that is, an American attack to vindicate our legitimate rights: “The Congress shall have Power . . . To declare War.” (I-8-11).  It can be inferred from the document that the government has no constitutional power to wage an unjust war.

The Constitution entrusts Congress with creating the means for waging war: “To raise and support Armies” (I-8-12),  “To provide and maintain a Navy” (I-8-13), and “To provide for calling forth the Militia to . . . repel Invasions” (I-8-15).  It grants the President authority to serve as Commander-in-Chief (II-2-1).  Under the latter provision, the President can oppose an invader (engage in defensive war) without prior congressional authorization, since “The United States [not just Congress] shall . . . protect each [state] against Invasion” (IV-4).   But there is no enumerated power authorizing the President to launch an offensive war without a congressional resolution that qualifies in substance as a declaration.

Many quotations from key Founders show that is was their understanding as well. For example, James Wilson, one of the greatest Founders, told the Pennsylvania ratifying convention:

“This system will not hurry us into war; it is calculated to guard against it. It will not be in the power of a single man, or a single body of men, to involve us in such distress; for the important power of declaring war is vested in the legislature at large: this declaration must be made with the concurrence of the House of Representatives. . . .”

(This quote is only one of several.)

Nevertheless, many well-meaning people have sought to find a presidential power to wage undeclared war.  In part they rely on practice arising decades, even centuries, after the Founding.  As I point out in The Original Constitution: What It Actually Said and Meant,such evidence is too remote to be a reliable source of original understanding.  The fact that the President sometimes has acted unconstitutionally does not render those acts constitutional.

The most sophisticated presidential defenders make the following argument:

*    What determines constitutional force is not how the ratifiers understood the document, but its objective “original public meaning” to the larger public;

*    the Constitution grants the President the “executive Power” (II-1-1);

*    although the Constitution does not mention undeclared wars, based on the practice of the British Crown the President’s “executive Power” included authority to initiate them.

Unfortunately for this argument, recent scholarship has largely destroyed the view that the phrase “the executive Power” conferred the King of England’s power on the President.  The most comprehensive study of the subject is Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty’s  article,Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 545 (2004).  In addition,my own published investigation of Founding-Era legal drafting practices discovered that those practices were completely inconsistent with the conclusion that the phrase “executive Power” conferred any authority.

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As for the claim that the Constitution’s “original public meaning” trumps what the ratifiers understood, to my knowledge no one has contested the conclusions of my excruciatingly-footnoted 2007 study of Founding-Era interpretative methods.  It concluded that the Constitution was to be interpreted by the ratifiers’ understanding, with “original public meaning” being consulted only when a coherent understanding could not be found.  In the case of the war power, though, the ratifiers’ understanding is pretty clear.

Although the Obama administration’s Libya operations probably qualify as a constitutionally-authorized “just war” (because it is designed to assist an oppressed people who have risen in rebellion), launching those operations without prior congressional consent violated the Constitution.

In private life, Rob Natelson is a long-time conservative/free market activist, but professionally he is a constitutional scholar whose meticulous studies of the Constitution’s original meaning have been published or cited by many top law journals. (See http://constitution.i2i.org/about/.) Most recently, he co-authored The Origins of the Necessary and Proper Clause (Cambridge University Press) and The Original Constitution (Tenth Amendment Center). After a quarter of a century as Professor of Law at the University of Montana, he recently retired to work full time at Colorado’s Independence Institute. Visit his blog there at http://constitution.i2i.org/

With military action taking place in Libya right now, the essential question must be asked: Is it even Constitutional? For those of you who don’t want to read more than a sentence or two, here’s the short answer. Absolutely not.

DELEGATED POWERS

The ninth and tenth amendments, while they didn’t add anything new, defined the Constitution. In short, they tell us that the federal government is only authorized to exercise those powers delegated to it in the Constitution…and nothing more. Everything else is either prohibited or retained by the states or people themselves.

What does this have to do with Libya? Well, whenever the federal government does anything, the first question should always be, “where in the Constitution is the authority to do this?” What follows here is an answer regarding American bombs being dropped on Libya.

WHO DECIDES?

Ever since the Korean War, Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution has been regularly cited as justification for the President to act with a seemingly free reign in the realm of foreign policy – including the initiation of foreign wars. But, it is Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution that lists the power to declare war, and this power is placed solely in the hands of Congress.

Article II, Section 2, on the other hand, refers to the President as the “commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States.” What the founders meant by this clause was that once war was declared, it would then be the responsibility of the President, as the commander-in-chief, to direct the war.

Alexander Hamilton clarified this when he said that the President, while lacking the power to declare war, would have “the direction of war when authorized.”

Thomas Jefferson reaffirmed this quite eloquently when, in 1801, he said that, as President, he was “unauthorized by the Constitution, without the sanction of Congress, to go beyond the line of defense.”

In Federalist #69, Alexander Hamilton explained that the President’s authority:

“would be nominally the same with that of the King of Great Britain, but in substance much inferior to it. It would amount to nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces, as first general and admiral of the confederacy; while that of the British king extends to the declaring of war, and to the raising and regulating of fleets and armies; all which by the constitution under consideration would appertain to the legislature.”

James Madison warned us that the power of declaring war must be kept away from the executive branch when he wrote to Thomas Jefferson:

“The constitution supposes, what the history of all governments demonstrates, that the executive is the branch of power most interested in war, and most prone to it. It has accordingly with studied care vested the question of war in the legislature.”

WORDS HAVE MEANING

If, like any legal document, the words of the Constitution mean today just what they meant the moment it was signed, we must first look for the 18th Century meaning of the words used. Here’s a few common 18th-century definitions of the important words:

War: The exercise of violence against withstanders under a foreign command.
Declare: Expressing something before it is promised, decreed, or acted upon.
Invade: To attack a country; to make a hostile entrance

What does this all mean? Unless the country is being invaded, if congress does not declare war against another country, the president is constitutionally barred from waging it, no matter how much he desires to do so. Pre-emptive strikes and undeclared offensive military expeditions are not powers delegated to the federal government in the Constitution, and are, therefore, unlawful.

HOW IT APPLIES TODAY

Here’s the quick overview of how this all plays out:

• In Constitutional terms, the United States is currently at war with Libya.
• Libya is not invading the United States, nor has it threatened to do so.
• Congress has not declared war. Barack Obama did.

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Some would claim, and news articles are already reporting on it, that the 1973 war powers resolution authorizes the President to start a war as long as it’s reported to Congress within 48 hours. Then, Congress would have 60 days to authorize the action, or extend it.

The only question you should have to ask for this would be – “where in the Constitution is congress given the authority to change the constitution by resolution?”

It doesn’t. And that resolution, in and of itself, is a Constitutional violation. More on that in a future article, of course.

James Madison had something to say about such a plan when he wrote:

“The executive has no right, in any case, to decide the question, whether there is or is not cause for declaring war.” [emphasis added]

War Powers resolution or no war powers resolution – without a Congressional declaration, the president is not authorized to start an offensive military campaign. Period.

The bottom line? By using US Military to begin hostilities with a foreign nation without a Congressional declaration of war, Barack Obama has committed a serious violation of the Constitution. While he certainly is not the first to do so in regards to war powers, it’s high time that he becomes the last.

American government under the Constitution was supposedly meant to work as follows: Congress, staying within delegated powers and the Bill of Rights, passes laws; the president executes the laws; and the courts sort out ensuing wrangles. This plan ran aground rather early—the 1798 Alien and Sedition Acts, for example—which raises at least two possibilities: 1) The Federalist movement systematically misrepresented its project or 2) the framers’ well-meant “design” fell short of their goals. Figuring this out is difficult, with original sin, human nature, foreign complications, and more tangling up the causal chain.

Even so, the Constitution—read anywhere near its apparent intent—might be worth hanging onto; but how can we get such a reading? Enter a new crop of “conservative” legalists to offer us one under the rubric of “originalism.”

For this crop of presidentialists, which includes John C. Yoo, Roger J. Delahunty, David Addington, Jay S. Bybee, and Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, originalism centers on the Unitary Executive Theory (UET)—a bizarre doctrine of presidential infallibility allegedly prefigured by Alexander Hamilton. Under the UET, America ’s president is utterly sovereign in his sphere and sole judge of his own powers.

The merest glance at America ’s founding suggests that no one really wanted full-bore elective despotism. Nonetheless, American presidentialists apparently find just that in the terms “war powers” and “commander-in-chief,” and in presidential dominance of foreign affairs. Yet their forebear Hamilton conceded that in war the president has “nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces, as first General and Admiral of the Confederacy” (Federalist 69).

Presidentialists take John Marshall’s comment, in Congress, that the president is our “sole organ of communication” with other nations as entailing lots of power. And always, presidents assert powers and store up precedents. Presidentialists turn presidential duties, chores, and everyday practices into powers, and strong figures have built the office. In the Mexican War (1846–48), President James Polk established the practical precedent of maneuvering Congress into war. But it was Abraham Lincoln, above all, who asserted immeasurable war powers belonging (mostly) to the president, by combining the commander-in-chief clause with the president’s job of enforcing the laws. Of this, legal historian Raoul Berger writes in Executive Privilege: “[W]hen nothing is added to nothing the sum remains nothing.” But success succeeds, and later presidents— Richard Nixon and George W. Bush among them—have eagerly wrapped themselves in Lincoln ’s mantle of effectively suspending the Constitution to save the country.

After Lincoln, presidential war powers rested up until 1898, when President William McKinley wielded them overseas. (McKinley issued a virtual ultimatum to Spain over Cuba a month before Congress declared war.) Theodore Roosevelt thought he could do anything not prohibited, at home and abroad, thereby neatly reversing the premise on which the Constitution was sold. Woodrow Wilson, too, had large views, but in 1917–1918 amiably shared with Congress the power of treading liberty under foot (conscription, for example), albeit with no new doctrines, merely existing bad ones.

Worse luck, in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Co. (1936), conservative Supreme Court Justice George Sutherland fancied that during our revolution, George III’s prerogative powers somehow lighted on the union, hovering, extra-constitutionally, above successive Congresses, descending finally on the presidency. Berger deconstructed Curtiss-Wright, underscoring the break with England and the resulting institutional discontinuity. Sutherland’s opinion stands, approvingly cited by UE theorists.

As Berger notes, Sutherland championed “a theory of inherent presidential power over foreign relations.” Berger quotes Louis Henkin, who adds that Sutherland’s assertion “carves a broad exception in the historic conception . . . never questioned and explicitly reaffirmed in the Tenth Amendment, that the federal government is one of enumerated powers only.”

Presidential power made great strides under Franklin Roosevelt, before and during World War II. FDR’s domestic emergencies and his wartime operations added much to the office. The Cold War extended these power-accumulations into an indefinite and interesting future.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (1952), during the Korean War, reflected existing realities. Briefly, President Harry Truman, citing war powers, seized the steel industry to end a strike. People across the political spectrum, from organized labor to Republican Senator Robert Taft, denounced the action. The Supreme Court dodged the issue, holding that presidential powers did not go quite as far as Truman thought.

Bottomless Well of Power

Presidentialists take “The executive power shall be vested” (Article II) for a bottomless well. They see the specific duties mentioned as additional grants of power open to further (perhaps tortured) interpretation. They find further “inherent powers” arising from international law and Marshall’s sole organhood, and read the oath—“faithfully execute the office” and “preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution”—as allowing the president to violate laws in defense of the Constitution. Yet the charge that the president “take care that the laws be faithfully executed”(Article II, Section 3) seems to prohibit such maneuvers, although presidents have bent the words to their purposes, as when Lincoln “combined” them with the commander-in-chief provision.

Presidential lawyers aggregate or separate clauses to widen power. Political scientist Richard M. Pious writes in American Presidency that presidential lawyers, construing congressional powers strictly, view “all remaining functions, powers, and duties [as] exercised by the president under doctrines of inherent powers, resulting powers, sovereign powers, and inclusions”—along with emergency and national-security powers. Finally, presidents—as a branch of government—assert a right to interpret the Constitution. Pious shows minimal respect for these notions, commenting that recent, barely elected presidents have felt a need to exploit their “legal” opportunities.

From 1947 on, anticommunist crusading fostered right-wing presidentialism. Meanwhile, on other issues the Supreme Court provoked a reaction toward strict construction. Since that was quite incompatible with Cold War policies, something had to give; when it did, right-wing presidentialists hijacked strict construction, reinventing it as absolutist originalism. Midway through this journey, Richard Nixon’s cries of “national security”—to becloud the Watergate affair—rang like a fire bell in the day.

In his online paper “Rethinking Presidential Power—The Unitary Executive and the George W. Bush Presidency,” political scientist Christopher S. Kelley writes that, frustrated by ongoing congressional “aggression” against executive power—the War Powers Act of 1973 and congressional “interference” with federal bureaucracies—lawyers in the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel cobbled UE theory together in the 1980s. During war—as everyone “knows”—the feds may freeze the Bill of Rights, provided they thaw it out later. What seems new in UE theory is the assertion that the president is sole judge of his powers, with Congress and courts excluded from inquiring into executive undertakings. (Nixon claimed to be sole judge of executive privilege.) This would seem a recipe for tyranny.

UE theorists speak of constitutional text, structure, and history; but their postmodern textual maneuvers, their homemade structures, and their lawyer’s history live on the edge of sudden implosion. In a 2003 paper, “Judicial Review and the War on Terrorism,” John Yoo, who had worked in the Bush 43 Office of Legal Counsel, asserted that while the judicial process exists for issues involving federalism, none exists for issues arising from war. He thereby nodded toward UE theorists’ oft-professed belief in states’ rights while separating all such “domestic” matters from important presidential activities. Yoo praised “the war powers system we have today in which the President initiates war, Congress funds it, and the courts remain aloof.” Further, the president may designate citizens as enemies, with no further proof or process needed.

Elsewhere, in “The President’s Constitutional Authority to Conduct Military Operations against Terrorist Organizations and the Nations that Harbor or Support Them,” Yoo and Roger Delahunty examine Article II of the Constitution where they see the mere words “the executive power shall be vested in a President”—the high-toned “Vesting Clause”—as unveiling a mighty fortress: “The executive power” (my emphasis). The authors assign the president “all of the executive power” and “full control“ of the military, adducing his power to “repel sudden attacks,” commending his “speed and energy.” Predictably, they hold that Congress has only powers “herein granted” and “enumerated,” while the president has “all other unenumerated powers.” Backed by “historical practice” and “precedent,” “the President alone” decides war and peace. This is textualism?

The shades of Wilson, FDR, and Truman must be smiling. Few non-White House supremacists would read texts so liberally. A whole generation of conservative constitutionalists now surpasses Earl Warren in creative writing. Some conservatives foment empire, militarism, surveillance, and presidential hubris through their own juridical and judicial activism.

Such are the raw materials of UET, but there are a few more points of interest.

Unenumerated Powers Don’t Exist

1. Presidents reach for “all other unenumerated powers”; but by a well-known canon of construction, powers not enumerated are not “granted” and do not exist. The claim assumes the very thing to be proven. In Executive Privilege, Berger writes that, “lacking an ‘enumerated’ power, action is illegal” and observes that “faithfully executed” implies presidential accountability to Congress. Further, “executive privilege” (withholding information) asserts a power the King had already lost. He adds that “the Framers vested many prerogatives of the Crown in Congress and denied them to the President.”Berger remarks on the “meager scope” of the presidency’s projected powers: “The words ‘executive power’ were thus no more than a label designed to differentiate presidential from legislative functions, and to describe the powers thereafter conferred and enumerated. To derive additional authority from this descriptive label is to pervert the design of the Framers. . . .” Further: “Madison and [James] Wilson stated that the rights of ‘war and peace,’ enjoyed by the King, were not included in the ‘executive powers.’ Patently, the Framers were determined to cut all roots of the executive power in the royal prerogative.” Absent royal prerogative, the U.S. president would seem to be constitutionally impotent as far as finding and beginning his own wars goes. Practical politics made the office what it is today. In An Inquiry into the Principles and Policy of the Government of the United States (1814), John Taylor of Caroline, a serious strict constructionist, characterized the presidency as driving us toward “force and fraud” and “monarchy, revolution, and an iron government.” Election was an insufficient guard; for this reason the states put their executives under severe restrictions.
2. Presidential lawyers dig out generalities about emergencies from Hamilton ’s Federalist essays but little on who holds the emergency powers. Is it Congress? As an executive officer under George Washington, Hamilton “discovered” what prerogative powers he could, and presidentialists get more mileage from this Hamilton. Given two Hamiltons, his arguments are somewhat suspect. (On prerogative powers in the Constitution, present or absent, see Forrest McDonald’s Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution.)
   Precedent Yields No Right
3. UE theorists dwell on text, practice, and precedent. But whether successful usurpations—some large, some microscopic—amend the Constitution is not proven. Presidents have gotten away with things. As Berger points out, presidential stonewalling, which Congress has resisted for two centuries, yields no “right” of executive privilege. Yet much rests on the larger implications of executive privilege where successfully asserted. In Construction Construed and Constitutions Vindicated (1820), Taylor noted that the Stuarts collected precedents “because, successive encroachments terminate in conquest.” Moreover: “precedents, both good and bad, ought to have weight. . . . But discrimination is as applicable to precedents, as to any other species of evidence . . . [and] no improvement in civil government has ever been made, or can be preserved, but by a subversion of precedents, until a form is discovered incapable of corruption.”
4. UE theorists make much of the president’s job of repelling invasions of American soil. That this seldom happens is, for them, beside the point. Two much-mooted cases—Pearl Harbor and 9/11—drew forth no repelling. In 1846 President Polk was not repelling but was instead provoking. Nor was the Confederate attack on Fort Sumter, after months of talk, sudden, unexpected, or repelled. Given time, advocates might find some repelling, and so what? If the president failed to repel, defenders would still defend. Where is the mighty grant of “executive power”? Presidentialists hope to convince us that should a president ever defend American soil, he would be “making war,” thereby proving—apparently—that he may make war anywhere, anytime, at will. In “Emergency Powers and the Militia Acts,” legal scholar Stephen I. Vladeck does not concede a presidential power of repelling. Instead, such actions have rested on the Militia Acts of 1792, 1795, and 1807, and their successors, that is, on delegation by Congress. This greatly reduces what presidents can reasonably obtain from repelling. Indeed, they just break even with the states, which may “engage in war” when actually invaded.
5. For UE theory, “separation of powers” works overtime, albeit rather cynically. Berger writes: “the separation of powers does not create or grant power; it only protects powers conferred by the Constitution. . . . [T]o argue from the bare fact of a tripartite system of government, without preliminary inquiry into the scope of each of the three powers, is like invoking the magic of numerology.”In any case, classic separation took “checks and balances” rather seriously. But if the president has his own sovereign sphere, how is he checked—or balanced.This brings us to John Taylor’s attack on “spherical sovereignty” in Construction Construed. (All emphasis has been added.) In McCulloch v. Maryland (1819), Chief Justice John Marshall sustained the supremacy of Congress in its sphere of action. Taylor agreed that “‘sphere’ conveys an idea of something limited,” but wondered “how this word . . . can be converted into a substantive uncircumscribed, by the help of the adjective ‘sovereign.’” He continues: “If the sovereignty of the spheres means any sovereignty at all, it supersedes the sovereignty of the people. . . .”Now Taylor is not objecting to spheres, but to sovereignty anywhere, since American principles demand actual delegation by real principals to real (and mere) agents. No one has “inherent” powers.Taylor continues: “There is no phrase in the constitution which even insinuates, that the actual divisions of power should be altered or impaired by incidental or implied powers.” Further: “Individual spheres or departments are easily persuaded, like Kings, that a subordination to themselves would be better for a nation, than the occasional collisions produced by a division and limitation of power.” And here was the danger: “A jurisdiction, limited by its own will, is an unlimited jurisdiction.”Taylor thought “occasional collisions” better than sovereign institutions. Rather than making Congress, executive, or court supreme in some realm, the Constitution created “co-ordinate political departments, intended as checks upon each other, only invested with defined and limited powers, and subjected to the sovereignty . . . of the people. . . . ”The Court’s new-fangled “spherical sovereignty” overthrew the division of powers: “A supreme power able to abolish collisions, is also able to abolish checks, and there can be no checks without collisions.” In America we “have preferred checks and collisions, to a dictatorship of one department. . . .” Under “the concurrent power of taxation,” Congress and the states “may each pass a law, both of which may be constitutional, and yet these laws may clash with, or impede each other. . . . For this clashing the constitution makes no provision.”

   According to Taylor , the Court was unearthing prerogative powers for Congress, including one to “remove all obstacles to its action.” Marshall sought “to unite an extension of power with an apparent adherence to the words of the constitution.” Under this dodge, “it was necessary to hook every implied, to some delegated power. . . .” This is still the practice of a continental state that micromanages the life-world under color of regulating commerce and passes worldwide military empire off as “defense.”

   On Taylor ’s reading, no branch derives sovereign powers from idealized separateness. Powers, where they exist, were delegated by living Americans, not by some cloud-borne eighteenth-century paragraphs “mediating” sovereignty to federal departments.

6. UET’s “flexible system for going to war” (Yoo’s words) seems better fitted for finding and having wars than for actual defense of American soil. Here, where sovereignty and war powers conjure and conspire, UE theorists build on Marshall ’s gutting of enumerated powers and Sutherland’s “inherent” prerogatives; but Taylor whipped them before they were born, even on war powers:
   

   . . . [T]he case of war is specially provided for by the federal constitution, because the federal government, as having no sovereignty, could not other wise have declared it. . . . As the powers of making war and peace were necessary, it became necessary also to provide for them, not as emanations from the principle of a sovereignty in governments, but as delegated powers.. .. No powers in relation to war are derived from . . . sovereignty in governments under our system; and none can be justly inferred from the conclusions of the writers upon the laws of nations. . . .”[Emphasis supplied.]

   Presidential “signing statements,” grounded in UET, proclaim a departmental “reading” of what the president is signing into “law.” Unwilling to veto, President Bush says he will enforce the law (or not) as he sees fit. The attempt came before the name. In President: The Office and Powers, constitutional scholar Edward S. Corwin wrote of its having been undertaken in 1946–1947: “For a court to vary its interpretation of an act of Congress in deference to something said by the President at the time of signing would be . . . to endow him with a legislative power not shared by Congress.”

   Signing statements aim at influencing gullible jurists and, ultimately, at excluding the courts from even their normally feckless protection of liberty during alleged wars. (On this, see Richard E. Eliel’s “Freedom of Speech,” American Political Science Review, November 1924.)

Sovereignty, Unknown Powers, Strict Construction

If we forsake “originalism,” as we probably should, we need not give up strict construction. Any serious perspective must begin with contemporary comparisons of the Constitution as advertised with the Constitution as put into practice. Taylor, Spencer Roane, and others heard certain promises in the ratifying conventions and saw them broken once the promising parties were in office. Their critique rose from an unavoidable contrast. (For how quickly the Federalists’ real program emerged, see The Journal of William Maclay, U.S. senator from Pennsylvania , 1789–91, available online and in book form.)

In Construction Construed, Taylor went to the fundamentals. He began with “powers of sovereignty and supremacy [that] may be relished, because they tickle the mind with hopes and fears. . . .” Yet “the term ‘sovereignty,’ was sacrilegiously stolen from the attributes of God, and impiously assumed by Kings . . . [and] aristocracies and republicks have claimed the spoil.” In any case, the “idea of investing servants with sovereignty, and that of investing ourselves with a sovereignty over other nations, were equally preposterous.” (Now, of course, we do both.)

“Sovereignty” was “neither fiduciary nor capable of limitation.” In America, we “eradicate[d] it by establishing governments invested with specified and limited powers,” under which “the people or the states retain all the powers they have not bestowed . . . [and] ungranted rights remain also with the grantors . . . the people.” This canon of constitutional interpretation, by which powers “not granted” are seen as not granted—hence nonexistent—failed to impress Marshall and others. With more experience of the Constitution, we might judge Marshall wrong.

Taylor declined to see the words “To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States”( Article I, Section 8, 18) as a charter of unknown powers; Marshall, however, saw “necessary and proper” as licensing numberless convenient and apposite means, and alongside spherical sovereignty, this was his key innovation.

Lacking certain desired powers, Congress could not simply grasp them by calling them means “necessary and proper” for fulfilling actually enumerated powers. Before the Revolution, Taylor noted in Construction Construed, Parliament contended for unlimited means of war: “The colonies replied, that it would be more absurd to limit powers, and yet concede unlimited means for their execution . . . .” Marshall ’s repositioning of “means” undid the whole idea of enumeration. Taylor wrote: “As ends may be made to beget means, so means may be made to beget ends, until the co-habitation shall rear a progeny of unconstitutional bastards.”

Later court decisions have awarded the president the same “necessary and proper” latitude that it earlier gave Congress. The process is cumulative, but if the doctrine was unsound when aiding Congress, it remains so when fattening the executive.

Marshall undermined American political reasoning, said Taylor , “by inferring the powers of sovereignty from a delegated power; as the power of establishing banks, from the power of taxation . . . .” But reasoning from international law to American government was a mistake. Where foreign threats existed, “the constitution . . . disregarding . . . the laws of nations, assigns the power . . . to a department [Congress], not as being sovereign, but as being a trustee . . . [which] alone possesses a right to involve the United States in war; and no other department, nor any individual, has a better right to do so, than a constable has to bring the same calamity upon England. As the laws of nations cannot deprive congress of any power . . . so they cannot invest congress or any other department, with any power not bestowed by the constitution. . . . [Those laws] contemplate the powers of declaring war and making peace, as residing in an executive department; but the constitution divides them, and does not intrust the president with either” (emphasis supplied).

Contesting institutional sovereignty derived from international law, Taylor aimed right at UET theorists’ favorite things: the war powers and their location in the system.

Can Amendment Rid Us of This Turbulent Office?

Taylor ’s point is, very simply, that if the government has some general “sovereignty,” then it, or some branch of it, is the final judge of its actions. If the government is not sovereign, then the unknowably vast powers for war, emergencies, and so on must remain with the people, as individuals, families, or communities—a disturbing thought, even for believers in such powers. Such a theoretical placement might lead to individual civil disobedience and nullification by communities. Short of such drastic experiments, are there any constitutional cures for unitary-executive disease? Perhaps so. This brings us to our only remaining article of faith, the amending power.

Talk about unknown powers! We seem entirely free to abolish the executive in all its unitarity. Amendment, however, would require a train of disasters irrefutably stemming from that office. We have the disasters; the historical dice have been cast, but where will they land?

This article originally appeared in The Freeman – January 2007, Vol. 57, Issue 1.

In reading the Constitution, we can plainly see that Congress possesses the power “to regulate commerce with foreign nations, to raise and support armies, to grant letters of marque and reprisal, to provide for the common defense,” and even “to declare war.” Congress shares, with the President, the power to make treaties and to appoint ambassadors. As for the Executive, the President is assigned only two powers relating to foreign affairs; commander-in-chief of the armed forces, and the power to receive ambassadors.

The United States Constitution, which is the supreme law of the land in our country, delegates the power to declare war to the Congress and the power to wage war to the President. What that means is that only the Congress, as representatives of the People and of the States, can determine whether or not the nation goes to war. If the People, through Congress, decide that the nation shall go to war, the President then, and only then, has the authority to wage it.

Unless the country is being invaded, if the congress does not declare war against another country, the president is constitutionally barred from waging it, no matter how much he desires to do so. This is, again, shown clearly in the following statements:

“As the executive cannot decide the question of war on the affirmative side, neither ought it to do so on the negative side, by preventing the competent body from deliberating on the question.”
- Thomas Jefferson

“The executive has no right, in any case, to decide the question, whether there is or is not cause for declaring war.”
- James Madison

Presidential orders, even those issued as commander-in-chief, are subject to restrictions imposed by Congress. A Congressional declaration of war, for example, limits Presidential powers, narrows the focus of the action, and implies, or clearly stipulates, a precise end-point to the conflict. Like it or not, the Constitution is clear, and the only way it can be changed is through the procedure for amendments as outlined in the Constitution.

All Presidents that have waged war without a Congressional declaration, including Presidents Truman, Johnson, Clinton and Bush, have broken the law; the law specifically stated in the Constitution; thereby conducting themselves like dictators, albeit democratically elected, in order to determine the future of foreign people and nations.

In addition, the fact that Congress is not permitted under the Constitution to transfer the war-declaring power to a President has been repeatedly ignored. Only Congress can declare war, if we are inclined to follow the rule of law. Thus, those members of Congress who’ve voted to do so are just as guilty, in violating the law, as Presidents have been in their act of accepting, rather than refusing, this illegal transfer of power.

To add insult to injury, many acts of war by our country have cited United Nations resolutions as justification. Ignoring the Constitution, while citing the UN as a justification for war, has shown us the callous disregard that our political rulers have had for the restraints written in the Constitution.

The framers deliberately wanted to make war difficult to embark upon without public legislative debate; thus, they intentionally kept this power out of the hands of the executive branch. It is logical to assume that they never would have dreamed of a President with such powers, or of the possibility that an international governmental body would have influence over our foreign policy; telling us when we should or should not enter into armed conflict.

As a result of our multiple undeclared wars, millions of people are dead. Since just 1999, United States’ forces have attacked at least three more nations. Each time, a President has either started the war outright, or allowed Congress to relinquish its power to decide.

Without a proper declaration or war, without public debate, without the People deciding whether or not to engage in conflict, no war is legal, moral, or just! This is exactly what our nation’s founders warned against when creating our government. Most had just left behind a monarchy where the power to declare and wage war rested on the decision of one person, the King of England. It is this they most wished to avoid.

Some have argued that the war-declaring power comes from the sum of constitutional provisions dealing with war. Abraham Lincoln’s well-known act of combining the commander-in-chief clause with the clause authorizing the President to enforce the laws is a misbegotten form of this claim.

Resolutions authorizing the Executive to initiate force are not declarations of war, however, and this point is of the greatest concern to our nation; these resolutions transfer the constitutionally-mandated Congressional authority to declare wars to the executive branch. These resolutions have told Presidents that they, and they alone, have the authority to determine when, where, why, and how war will be declared, waged, and completed.

Numerous bills have been passed by Congress, merely asking the Executive to give a courtesy report to the People, through Congress, sometime after war has begun to let us know what is happening.

But, in an age where warfare can destroy nations and people in weeks rather than years, any resolution requesting a courtesy call after conflict begins effectively hands to the Executive the dictatorial powers to declare, wage, and complete wars without the input of Congress and the People.

However, as the Supreme Court affirmed long ago, the Constitution does not permit one branch of government to delegate its powers to another branch. Thus, Congressional resolutions authorizing the President to decide whether or not to invade a foreign nation are null and void under the Constitution; leaving the President with the illegal dictatorial power to both declare and wage war.

President Clinton’s bombing of Sudan and Afghanistan on the eve of his indictment ended a Taliban plan to expel Osama bin Laden from Afghanistan. His bombing of Yugoslavia resulted in thousands of deaths, and his bombing of Baghdad on the eve of his impeachment hardly reassured anyone of a just and balanced American foreign policy.

President Bush chose to ignore the United States Constitution by ordering our military into Iraq. His son has done the same. President Reagan ignored the Constitution by attacking Libya, while Presidents Kennedy and Johnson did so by sending troops to Vietnam.

The continued bombing, blockade, and subsequent invasion of Iraq has been carried out by three Presidents and Congresses led by both major political parties. The result? The deaths of well-over a million innocents.

In launching illegal wars, these, and other Presidents sent the world the following message: While the United States is a nation that has a Constitution which expressly limits the President’s power regarding warfare; in practice, our system of government gives the Executive the power to ignore the law and exercise dictatorial powers instead.

Michael Boldin [send him email] is the founder of the Tenth Amendment Center.

The framers of the Constitution attempted to balance the power of the President as commander-in-chief with that of Congress, the representatives of the People.

Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution gives to the Executive Branch the command of the nation’s armed forces, while Article I, Section 8 gives to the Legislative Branch the power to decide when the United States goes to war.

Presidential candidate, Bob Barr has taken a strong stand in support of the Constitution in a recent post on his website:

“Former Secretaries of State James Baker and Warren Christopher have proposed a new statute to encourage the president and Congress to cooperate in going to war. But the Constitution already sets forth a clear rule: Congress, and only Congress, is tasked with declaring war,” explains Bob Barr, the Libertarian Party presidential candidate. “Absent exigent circumstances, like defending against a surprise attack, only Congress has the authority to take America into a conflict.”

When crafting the Constitution, the founders weighed the individual will of the Executive against the deliberative function of the Legislature, whose constituents would bear the full costs of any war.

Thus, the framers deliberately separated the powers of declaring and waging war; they confined these powers in such a way so as to thwart the tyranny of kings.

Despite being known as one of the greatest champions of centralized power of the times, even Alexander Hamilton felt that the President must generally bow to Congressional directions in times of peace and also in times of war. He stated this clearly in Federalist #69:

“The President is to be commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States. In this respect, his authority would be nominally the same with that of the king of Great Britain, but in substance much inferior to it. It would amount to nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces.; while that of the British king extends to the declaring of war and to the raising and regulating of fleets and armies – all which, by the Constitution under consideration, would appertain to the legislature.”

Our nation’s founders were far from perfect, and at times, inconsistent and unjust; but, on the powers of war, they were unwavering, and their principles were sound.

Barr again shines in his recognition of the separation of war-declaring vs war-making powers:

“presidents must acknowledge that being military commander-in-chief does not entitle them to take the nation into war. Rather, they are to fight only conflicts authorized by Congress,” Barr observes. “At the same time, Congresses must be willing to confront tough issues, rather than leave them for the president. Legislators have no higher responsibility under the Constitution and to the voters than to decide when Americans must fight abroad.”

One obvious reason for dividing the war powers was to prevent such massive powers from being placed in the hands of one person, the President.

The framers understood that, throughout history, rulers of nations worldwide had begun wars strictly on the basis of international politics or personal desires.

They clearly understood that rulers would often get the urge to remove foreign public officials, or dictate the policies of foreign nations, and that such urges are dangerous to liberty, no matter what the reason.

The reason for entrusting the Legislature with the power to declare war was to ensure that the People would be involved in the decision as much as was physically possible.

What the Framers did not imagine was a weak and ineffectual Congress that failed to claim its rightful authority in deciding when the nation would go to war, or a power-hungry President that wouldn’t refuse an extra-constitutional transfer of such power from Congress.

By rejecting the advice and the rules laid down by the founders and early Presidents, our recent leaders have gone so far astray from warnings against entangling alliances, that the founders would hardly recognize the government they created.

Policing the world and “spreading democracy” is not our calling. Additionally, no such action is permitted by the Constitution.

Michael Boldin [send him email] is the founder of the Tenth Amendment Center

Copyright © 2008 by TenthAmendmentCenter.com. Permission to reprint in whole or in part is gladly granted, provided full credit is given.

And now, John McCain’s new advisor, Michael Goldfarb, is making the claim that the executive branch has “near dictatorial powers”

Read more of what Goldfarb has written at Salon.com:

Mitchell’s less than persuasive answer [to whether withdrawal timetables "somehow infringe on the president's powers as commander in chief?"]: “Congress is a coequal branch of government…the framers did not want to have one branch in charge of the government.”

True enough, but they sought an energetic executive with near dictatorial power in pursuing foreign policy and war. So no, the Constitution does not put Congress on an equal footing with the executive in matters of national security.

Seems that people like Goldfarb are doing a little selective reading. People like Alexander Hamilton clearly wanted a very “energetic” executive branch, but there were many, many others, such as Patrick Henry, James Madison, Thomas Jefferson, etc – who wanted co-equal branches.

The Constitution was written under a simple principle – positive grant. In short, what this means is this: The federal government is authorized to exercise only those powers which are specifically given to it in the Constitution.Everything else is “reserved to the States, respectively, or to the People.”

Period.

The 10th Amendment, for example, makes it quite clear:

“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”

Read more here:

• Why We Have a 10th Amendment
• The Enumerated Powers Act
  
• The Other Founders: The Dissenting Tradition in America

More memos recently have surfaced that were written early in the Bush administration by John C. Yoo from the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel — the man who gave us the administration’s horrifyingly narrow definition of torture. As difficult as it is to believe, the recently released memos are even scarier than the original torture memo.

Yoo boldly asserts that the president’s power during wartime is nearly unlimited. For example, he argues that Congress has no right to pass laws governing the interrogations of enemy combatants and the commander-in-chief can ignore such laws if passed, and can, without constraint, seize oceangoing ships.

The memos also argue that military operations in the United States against terrorists are not subject to the Fourth Amendment requirement for search warrants or the Fifth Amendment requirement for due process.

This broad interpretation of executive power and the president’s commander-in-chief role would make the nation’s founders jump out of their graves. Purposefully, the Constitutional Convention enumerated the large number of Congress’s powers in Article I, and gave most powers related to defense and foreign affairs to the people’s branch.

In particular, the war power was given to Congress. The chief executive, whose powers were enumerated in the much more brief Article II, was given the commander-in-chief role, but this was intended narrowly, only as commander of U.S. troops on the battlefield.

Instead of declaring war, which has fallen out of fashion, the Congress, after 9/11, passed a resolution authorizing the president to go after al-Qaida overseas but deliberately omitted domestic activities from that authorization.

Democrats and Republicans alike declared that they were not endorsing a broad expansion of the president’s authority as commander-in-chief.

An important example from the nation’s infancy shows how narrowly the founders regarded the president’s role as commander-in-chief. During the Quasi-War with France in the last years of the 1700s, Congress authorized President John Adams to seize armed ships sailing to French ports. Adams exceeded the congressional authorization by ordering the seizure of vessels sailing to or from French ports. The Supreme Court, in the case Little v. Barreme, ruled that Adams had exceeded the authority Congress had delegated to him. So much for Bush’s supposed intrinsic authority to seize all oceangoing ships without congressional authorization.

In 1952, President Truman, the first imperial president, seized the steel mills under his alleged “inherent power” as commander in chief — supposedly to prevent paralysis of the national economy and using the rationale that soldiers in the Korean War needed weapons and ammunition.

By a wide margin, in the case Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, the Supreme Court struck down Truman’s executive order to seize the mills because it had no statutory or constitutional basis. Essentially, the court ruled that the president may be commander-in-chief of the armed forces but not the country.

Yoo’s assertion that Congress has no right to pass laws that impinge on the president’s claim to a broad interpretation of his role as commander-in-chief violates the core of the constitutional system of checks and balances, and for which the United States regularly criticizes despots in foreign countries.

Finally, the Fourth Amendment (requiring warrants for any search) and the Fifth Amendment (the right to due legal process) contain no exceptions for wartime. In fact, in a republic — where the rule of law should be king — crises and wartime are exactly when people’s rights are most likely to be endangered and when safeguards are especially needed.

Even more tragic and dangerous than the quagmires of Iraq and Afghanistan have been President Bush’s usurping of power from the other two branches of government and the creation of the “hyperimperial” presidency.

Ivan Eland is Director of the Center on Peace & Liberty at The Independent Institute. Dr. Eland is a graduate of Iowa State University and received an M.B.A. in applied economics and Ph.D. in national security policy from George Washington University. He has been Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, and he spent 15 years working for Congress on national security issues, including stints as an investigator for the House Foreign Affairs Committee and Principal Defense Analyst at the Congressional Budget Office. He is author of the books, The Empire Has No Clothes: U.S. Foreign Policy Exposed, and Putting “Defense” Back into U.S. Defense Policy.

© 2008 – Ivan Eland – All Rights Reserved

You can ask anybody what the first amendment prevents infringement upon. They might know about one thing, freedom of speech, but incorrectly, tell you we are granted freedom of speech. Even then, most miss the other four inalienable rights the Constitution limits the federal government from violating.

Most are equally unaware of the right of the people to keep and bear arms, and even of their status as militia under U.S. code. Most also don’t know that the third amendment prevents forced slumber parties with soldiers, and further assume that one’s right to be secure in his papers, person and effects can be waived by law – without a rebellion or invasion. They also believe that the seizure of life, liberty or property is okay without a warrant, just compensation or due process is legal.

What about the ninth amendment, the one that restricts powers granted to the federal government from being construed to deny rights retained by the states of the people?

That, too, was forgotten.

What should concern us the most is the tenth amendment. It denies the federal government from assuming any additional powers not granted to it by the Constitution. There are many historical reasons.

I didn’t catch the right of the government to pay farmers not to grow food in Article 1, Section 8. But FDR thought that raising the price of food when most of us were eating ketchup sandwiches was a great plan.

Our founders certainly didn’t write things like Social Security or Medicare into the Constitution. That’s not because they hated the disadvantaged.

It was because they foresaw that such programs would be abused, their trust funds raided and their recipients deprived. Some estimates have concluded Social Security recipients to be deprived of as much as 43% of their benefits. According to GAO comptroller David Walker, there is no “lock box”.

Our founders also didn’t authorize a central bank of issue that would loan us our own money in Article 1, Section 8. That’s because such organizations habitually ruin a currency. In fact, the dollar we have them in 1913 is worth less than four cents.

After the Bank of England virtually destroyed their economy, which was the real impetus of the revolt, we learned a little more. After our failed experiment with the Continental Dollar, we figured it out.

What is truly disturbing is that the Federal Reserve is not a government entity, as ruled in Lewis v United States 680 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1982).

Calling it “federal” did not make it federal. Federal Express is not federal, and Federal Pizza is not federal because it has pepperoni.

Congress then had the audacity to tell us that Article 1, Section 8 gave them authority delegate their power to a private entity, and they don’t need to oversee monetary policy. Given its absolute failure to safeguard the value of the dollar, we have again learned why the tenth amendment prohibited this.

I personally wonder how bad the economy has to get before people figure it out. Since the Federal Reserve is now fighting inflation with inflation, my suspicion is that people will get the bailouts they’re asking for – and they will get it hard.

Nothing in Article 1, Section 8 includes education. There is also, again, nothing in there about healthcare. We were number one in healthcare and education, but federal involvement took care of that.

Go ask a college graduate what the tenth amendment says. Then, ask that same graduate if he or she would object to the healthcare industry writing its own laws. The irony is that people seek to break up monopolies through government, when in fact, monopolies are only possible through government.

What should frighten us the most is that Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution authorizes Congress to declare war. We’ve had a never ending series of wars since World War Two – but no declaration of war.

If the president is declaring war, and the tenth amendment bars any part of the government from assuming powers it does not have, when will it end? If you want to delegate that power, amend the Constitution, Congress. Don’t tell us you can write a law outside the parameters of your authority without extending them.

Will the Supreme Court eventually declare war? In a sad way, I’d prefer it. There’d be a chance for a dissenting opinion.

Contempt for the tenth amendment is truly limitless, and, not surprisingly, we’re broke. Instead of sending us checks as a bail out from monetary and fiscal mismanagement, which will come from raiding Social Security, Medicare or more inflation, Congress should go figure it out. I can’t think of a higher insult to the poorest, who suffer first and foremost from this, than to steal their wages while debasing their purchasing power and offshoring jobs.

As the reader may infer, this discussion could go on all day. I’ll just leave you with a brief list of things I’d like Congress to show me in Article 1, Section 8, or for that matter, any other part of the Constitution. Show me –

• Drug war
• Tax credit for producing coal dipped in latex
• Paying Americans to run sweatshops overseas
• Registering churches with the IRS
• Study on sex life of mosquitoes
• Gun control
• Executive negotiation of treaties without Senate input
• The WTO telling us how to run our trade policy
• Using our armed forces on behalf of the UN

Dan Reale is a Libertarian Party candidate for Congress in Connecticut.  Visit his website at http://realedealforcongress.angelfire.com

The war happened because when Bush first indicated his intention to go to war against Iraq, Congress refused to insist on enforcement of Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution. For more than 200 years, this article has spelled out that Congress — not the president — shall have “the power to declare war.”

Because the Constitution cannot be amended by persistent evasion, this constitutional mandate was not erased by the actions of timid Congresses since World War II that allowed eager presidents to start wars in Vietnam and elsewhere without a “declaration” by Congress.

Nor were the feeble, post-factum congressional resolutions of support of the Iraq invasion — in 2001 and 2002 — adequate substitutes for the formal declaration of war demanded by the founding fathers.

This is the essence of the unconstitutionality of the war in Iraq – and of every war American politicians have waged since World War II – the last time there was a Constitutionally-mandated declaration of war.

POSITIVE GRANT

The Constitution was written under the principle of “positive grant.” This means that the federal government is authorized to exercise only those powers which are specifically listed in the Constitution. This was so important to the founding fathers that they codified it in law as the Tenth Amendment:

“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”

As Cuomo made clear, Article I, Section 8 of states that Congress shall have the “power to declare war.” Nowhere in the Constitution is the Congress given authority to transfer that power to any other person or branch. And, nowhere is the president given the power to declare war either.

AUMF. AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL TRANSFER

In 2002, Congress passed the “Authorization to Use Military Force” (AUMF). Although Congress claimed that this legislation “satisfied” the requirements of Article I, Section 8, it did not.

The AUMF was not a declaration of war. It authorized the president to make that decision on his discretion. Thus, the AUMF was a transfer of the war-declaring powers to the excecutive branch – which is clearly not authorized by the Constitution.

In short, what Congress told the president with the passing of the AUMF was “You decide when or if we go to war with Iraq. Just let us know shortly after.”

Therefore, every single member of Congress who voted to transfer this power to the president violated the Constitution. And, the president violated the Constitution by not refusing this illegal transfer of power.

It’s pretty simple. When one branch breaks the law, it’s up to the others to “check” that branch. But, unfortunately, all three branches have been ignoring the plain English of the Constitution for decades.

NO MATTER WHAT

As far as declaring war, James Madison, the “father of the Constitution,” summed it up best:

“The executive has no right, in any case, to decide the question, whether there is or is not cause for declaring war.”

It’s in plain English. No right. In any case.

That even includes a situation where the Congress violates the Constitution and transfers its war-declaring powers to the president.

In any case.

No matter what.

Period.