Since my 2008 campaign for the presidency I have often been asked, “How would a constitutionalist president go about dismantling the welfare-warfare state and restoring a constitutional republic?” This is a very important question, because without a clear road map and set of priorities, such a president runs the risk of having his pro-freedom agenda stymied by the various vested interests that benefit from big government.

Of course, just as the welfare-warfare state was not constructed in 100 days, it could not be dismantled in the first 100 days of any presidency. While our goal is to reduce the size of the state as quickly as possible, we should always make sure our immediate proposals minimize social disruption and human suffering. Thus, we should not seek to abolish the social safety net overnight because that would harm those who have grown dependent on government-provided welfare. Instead, we would want to give individuals who have come to rely on the state time to prepare for the day when responsibility for providing aide is returned to those organizations best able to administer compassionate and effective help – churches and private charities.

Now, this need for a transition period does not apply to all types of welfare. For example, I would have no problem defunding corporate welfare programs, such as the Export-Import Bank or the TARP bank bailouts, right away. I find it difficult to muster much sympathy for the CEO’s of Lockheed Martin and Goldman Sachs.

No matter what the president wants to do, most major changes in government programs would require legislation to be passed by Congress. Obviously, the election of a constitutionalist president would signal that our ideas had been accepted by a majority of the American public and would probably lead to the election of several pro-freedom congressmen and senators. Furthermore, some senators and representatives would become “born again” constitutionalists out of a sense of self-preservation. Yet there would still be a fair number of politicians who would try to obstruct our freedom agenda. Thus, even if a president wanted to eliminate every unconstitutional program in one fell swoop, he would be very unlikely to obtain the necessary support in Congress.

Yet a pro-freedom president and his legislative allies could make tremendous progress simply by changing the terms of the negotiations that go on in Washington regarding the size and scope of government. Today, negotiations over legislation tend to occur between those who want a 100 percent increase in federal spending and those who want a 50 percent increase. Their compromise is a 75 percent increase. With a president serious about following the Constitution, backed by a substantial block of sympathetic representatives in Congress, negotiations on outlays would be between those who want to keep funding the government programs and those who want to eliminate them outright – thus a compromise would be a 50 percent decrease in spending!

While a president who strictly adheres to the Constitution would need the consent of Congress for very large changes in the size of government, such as shutting down cabinet departments, he could use his constitutional authority as head of the executive branch and as commander in chief to take several significant steps toward liberty on his own. The area where the modern chief executive has greatest ability to act unilaterally is in foreign affairs. Unfortunately, Congress has abdicated its constitutional authority to declare wars, instead passing vague “authorization of force” bills that allow the president to send any number of troops to almost any part of the world. The legislature does not even effectively use its power of the purse to rein in the executive. Instead, Congress serves as little more than a rubber stamp for the president’s requests.

If the president has the power to order U.S. forces into combat on nothing more than his own say-so, then it stands to reason he can order troops home. Therefore, on the first day in office, a constitutionalist can begin the orderly withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq and Afghanistan. He can also begin withdrawing troops from other areas of the world. The United States has over 300,000 troops stationed in more than 146 countries. Most if not all of these deployments bear little or no relationship to preserving the safety of the American people. For example, over 20 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the U.S. still maintains troops in Germany.

Domestically, the president can use his authority to set policies and procedures for the federal bureaucracy to restore respect for the Constitution and individual liberty. For example, today manufacturers of dietary supplements are subject to prosecution by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) or Federal Trade Commission (FTC) if they make even truthful statements about the health benefits of their products without going through the costly and time-consuming procedures required to gain government approval for their claims. A president can put an end to this simply by ordering the FDA and FTC not to pursue these types of cases unless they have clear evidence that the manufacturer’s clams are not true. Similarly, the president could order the bureaucracy to stop prosecuting consumers who wish to sell raw milk across state lines.

A crucial policy that a president could enact to bring speedy improvements to government is ordering the bureaucracy to respect the 10th Amendment and refrain from undermining state laws. We have already seen a little renewed federalism with the current administration’s policy of not prosecuting marijuana users when their use of the drug is consistent with state medical-marijuana laws. A constitutionalist administration would also defer to state laws refusing compliance with the REAL ID act and denying federal authority over interstate gun transactions. None of these actions repeals a federal law; they all simply recognize a state’s primary authority, as protected by the 10th amendment, to set policy in these areas.

In fact, none of the measures I have discussed so far involves repealing any written law. They can be accomplished simply by a president exercising his legitimate authority to set priorities for the executive branch. And another important step he can take toward restoring the balance of powers the Founders intended is repealing unconstitutional executive orders issued by his predecessors.

Executive orders are a useful management tool for the president, who must exercise control over the enormous federal bureaucracy. However, in recent years executive orders have been used by presidents to create new federal laws without the consent of Congress. As President Clinton’s adviser Paul Begala infamously said, “stroke of the pen, law of the land, pretty cool.” No, it is not “pretty cool,” and a conscientious president could go a long way toward getting us back to the Constitution’s division of powers by ordering his counsel or attorney general to comb through recent executive orders so the president can annul those that exceed the authority of his office. If the President believed a particular Executive Order made a valid change in the law, then he should work with Congress to pass legislation making that change.

Only Congress can directly abolish government departments, but the president could use his managerial powers to shrink the federal bureaucracy by refusing to fill vacancies created by retirements or resignations. This would dramatically reduce the number of federal officials wasting our money and taking our liberties. One test to determine if a vacant job needs to be filled is the “essential employees test.” Whenever D.C. has a severe snowstorm, the federal government orders all “non-essential” federal personal to stay home. If someone is classified as non-essential for snow-day purposes, the country can probably survive if that position is not filled when the jobholder quits or retires. A constitutionalist president should make every day in D.C. like a snow day!

A president could also enhance the liberties and security of the American people by ordering federal agencies to stop snooping on citizens when there is no evidence that those who are being spied on have committed a crime. Instead, the president should order agencies to refocus on the legitimate responsibilities of the federal government, such as border security. He should also order the Transportation Security Administration to stop strip-searching grandmothers and putting toddlers on the no-fly list. The way to keep Americans safe is to focus on real threats and ensure that someone whose own father warns U.S. officials he’s a potential terrorist is not allowed to board a Christmas Eve flight to Detroit with a one-way ticket.

Perhaps the most efficient step a president could take to enhance travel security is to remove the federal roadblocks that have frustrated attempts to arm pilots. Congress created provisions to do just that in response to the attacks of September 11, 2001. However, the processes for getting a federal firearms license are extremely cumbersome, and as a result very few pilots have gotten their licenses. A constitutionalist in the Oval Office would want to revise those regulations to make it as easy as possible for pilots to get approval to carry firearms on their planes.

While the president can do a great deal on his own, to really restore the Constitution and cut back on the vast unconstitutional programs that have sunk roots in Washington over 60 years, he will have to work with Congress. The first step in enacting a pro-freedom legislative agenda is the submission of a budget that outlines the priorities of the administration. While it has no legal effect, the budget serves as a guideline for the congressional appropriations process. A constitutionalist president’s budget should do the following:

1. Reduce overall federal spending
2. Prioritize cuts in oversize expenditures, especially the military
3. Prioritize cuts in corporate welfare
4. Use 50 percent of the savings from cuts in overseas spending to shore up entitlement programs for those who are dependent on them and the other 50 percent to pay down the debt
5. Provide for reduction in federal bureaucracy and lay out a plan to return responsibility for education to the states
6. Begin transitioning entitlement programs from a system where all Americans are forced to participate into one where taxpayers can opt out of the programs and make their own provisions for retirement and medical care

If Congress failed to produce a budget that was balanced and moved the country in a pro-liberty direction, a constitutionalist president should veto the bill. Of course, vetoing the budget risks a government shutdown. But a serious constitutionalist cannot be deterred by cries of “it’s irresponsible to shut down the government!” Instead, he should simply say, “I offered a reasonable compromise, which was to gradually reduce spending, and Congress rejected it, instead choosing the extreme path of continuing to jeopardize America’s freedom and prosperity by refusing to tame the welfare-warfare state. I am the moderate; those who believe that America can afford this bloated government are the extremists.”

Unconstitutional government spending, after all, is doubly an evil: it not only means picking the taxpayer’s pocket, it also means subverting the system of limited and divided government that the Founders created. Just look at how federal spending has corrupted American education.

Eliminating federal involvement in K–12 education should be among a constitutionalist president’s top domestic priorities. The Constitution makes no provision for federal meddling in education. It is hard to think of a function less suited to a centralized, bureaucratic approach than education. The very idea that a group of legislators and bureaucrats in D.C. can design a curriculum capable of meeting the needs of every American schoolchild is ludicrous. The deteriorating performance of our schools as federal control over the classroom has grown shows the folly of giving Washington more power over American education. President Bush’s No Child Left Behind law claimed it would fix education by making public schools “accountable.” However, supporters of the law failed to realize that making schools more accountable to federal agencies, instead of to parents, was just perpetuating the problem.

In the years since No Child Left Behind was passed, I don’t think I have talked to any parent or teacher who is happy with the law. Therefore, a constitutionalist president looking for ways to improve the lives of children should demand that Congress cut the federal education bureaucracy as a down payment on eventually returning 100 percent of the education dollar to parents.

Traditionally, the battle to reduce the federal role in education has been the toughest one faced by limited-government advocates, as supporters of centralized education have managed to paint constitutionalists as “anti-education.” But who is really anti-education? Those who wish to continue to waste taxpayer money on failed national schemes, or those who want to restore control over education to the local level? When the debate is framed this way, I have no doubt the side of liberty will win. When you think about it, the argument that the federal government needs to control education is incredibly insulting to the American people, for it implies that the people are too stupid or uncaring to educate their children properly. Contrary to those who believe that only the federal government can ensure children’s education, I predict a renaissance in education when parents are put back in charge.

The classroom is not the only place the federal government does not belong. We also need to reverse the nationalization of local police. Federal grants have encouraged the militarization of law enforcement, which has led to great damage to civil liberties. Like education, law enforcement is inherently a local function, and ending programs such as the Byrne Grants is essential not just to reducing federal spending but also to restoring Americans’ rights.

Obviously, a president concerned with restoring constitutional government and fiscal responsibility would need to address the unstable entitlement situation, possibly the one area of government activity even more difficult to address than education. Yet it is simply unfair to continue to force young people to participate in a compulsory retirement program when they could do a much better job of preparing for their own retirements. What is more, the government cannot afford the long-term expenses of entitlements, even if we were to reduce all other unconstitutional foreign and domestic programs.

As I mentioned in the introduction to this article, it would be wrong simply to cut these programs and throw those who are dependent on them “into the streets.” After all, the current recipients of these programs have come to rely on them, and many are in a situation where they cannot provide for themselves without government assistance. The thought of people losing the ability to obtain necessities for them because they were misled into depending on a government safety net that has been yanked away from them should trouble all of us. However, the simple fact is that if the government does not stop spending money on welfare and warfare, America may soon face an economic crisis that could lead to people being thrown into the street.

Therefore, a transition away from the existing entitlement scheme is needed. This is why a constitutionalist president should propose devoting half of the savings from the cuts in wars and other foreign spending, corporate welfare, and unnecessary and unconstitutional bureaucracies to shoring up Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid and providing enough money to finance government’s obligations to those who are already stuck in the system and cannot make alternative provisions. This re-routing of spending would allow payroll taxes to be slashed. The eventual goal would be to move to a completely voluntary system where people only pay payroll taxes into Social Security and Medicare if they choose to participate in those programs. Americans who do not want to participate would be free not to do so, but they would forgo any claim to Social Security or Medicare benefits after retirement.

Some people raise concerns that talk of transitions is an excuse for indefinitely putting off the end of the welfare state. I understand those concerns, which is why a transition plan must lay out a clear timetable for paying down the debt, eliminating unconstitutional bureaucracies, and setting a firm date for when young people can at last opt out of the entitlement programs.

A final area that should be front and center in a constitutionalist’s agenda is monetary policy. The Founders obviously did not intend for the president to have much influence over the nation’s money – in fact, they never intended any part of the federal government to operate monetary policy as it defined now. However, today a president could play an important role in restoring stability to monetary policy and the value of the dollar. To start, by fighting for serious reductions in spending, a constitutionalist administration would remove one of the major justifications for the Federal Reserve’s inflationary policies, the need to monetize government debt.

There are additional steps a pro-freedom president should pursue in his first term to restore sound monetary policy. He should ask Congress to pass two pieces of legislation I have introduced in the 110th Congress. The first is the Audit the Fed bill, which would allow the American people to learn just how the Federal Reserve has been conducting monetary policy. The other is the Free Competition in Currency Act, which repeals legal tender laws and all taxes on gold and silver. This would introduce competition in currency and put a check on the Federal Reserve by ensuring that people have alternatives to government-produced fiat money.

All of these measures will take a lot of work – a lot more than any one person, even the president of the United States, can accomplish by himself. In order to restore the country to the kind of government the Founders meant for us to have, a constitutionalist president would need the support of an active liberty movement. Freedom activists must be ready to pressure wavering legislators to stand up to the special interests and stay the course toward freedom. Thus, when the day comes when someone who shares our beliefs sits in the Oval Office, groups like Young Americans for Liberty and Campaign for Liberty will still have a vital role to play. No matter how many pro-freedom politicians we elect to office, the only way to guarantee constitutional government is through an educated and activist public devoted to the ideals of the liberty.

For that reason, the work of Young Americans for Liberty in introducing young people to the freedom philosophy and getting them involved in the freedom movement is vital to the future of our country. I thank all the members and supporters of YAL for their dedication to changing the political debate in this country, so that in the not-too-distant future we actually will have a president and a Congress debating the best ways to shrink the welfare-warfare state and restore the republic.

This essay originally appeared in Young American Revolution, the magazine of Young Americans for Liberty.

Dr. Ron Paul is a Republican member of Congress from Texas.

© 2010 Young Americans for Liberty

This article was originally published on December 11, 2006

The media, Congress, and the American public all seem to have accepted something that is patently untrue: namely, that foreign policy is the domain of the president and not Congress. This is absolutely not the case and directly contrary to what our founding fathers wanted.

The role of the president as Commander in Chief is to direct our armed forces in carrying out policies established by the American people through their representatives in Congress. He is not authorized to make those policies. He is an administrator, not a policy maker. Foreign policy, like all federal policy, must be made by Congress. To allow otherwise is to act in contravention of the Constitution.

Library of Congress scholar Louis Fisher, writing in The Oxford Companion to American Military History, summarizes presidential war power:

The president’s authority was carefully constrained. The power to repel sudden attacks represented an emergency measure that allowed the president, when Congress was not in session, to take actions necessary to repel sudden attacks either against the mainland of the United States or against American troops abroad. It did not authorize the president to take the country into full-scale war or mount an offensive attack against another nation.

But it’s not simply the decision to wage war that is left to Congress. Consider also the words of James Madison:

Those who are to conduct a war cannot in the nature of things, be proper or safe judges, whether a war ought to be commenced, continued, or concluded. They are barred from the latter functions by a great principle in free government, analogous to that which separates the sword from the purse, or the power of executing from the power of enacting laws (italics added).

So Congress is charged not only with deciding when to go to war, but also how to conduct– and bring to a conclusion– properly declared wars. Of course the administration has some role to play in making treaties, and the State Department should pursue beneficial diplomacy. But the notion that presidents should establish our broader foreign policy is dangerous and wrong.

No single individual should be entrusted with the awesome responsibility of deciding when to send our troops abroad, how to employ them once abroad, and when to bring them home. This is why the founders wanted Congress, the body most directly accountable to the public, to make critical decisions about war and peace.

It is shameful that Congress ceded so much of its proper authority over foreign policy to successive presidents during the 20th century, especially when it failed to declare war in Korea, Vietnam, Kosovo, and Iraq.

It’s puzzling that Congress is so willing to give away one of its most important powers, when most members from both parties work incessantly to expand the role of Congress in domestic matters. By transferring its role in foreign policy to the President, Congress not only violates the Constitution, but also disenfranchises the American electorate.

Ron Paul is a republican member of congress from Texas.

Presidential power has been on a pathway of expansion beyond what the Constitution outlined, and what a government of, by, and for the people requires, since George Washington was president. That expansion, which hit the highway after World War II, got a turbo boost during the co-presidency of George W. Bush and Dick Cheney.

Some of the new powers that those two stole from Congress, the courts, the states, and us the people are being abused less severely in this new age of Obama; others, more so; but far more crucially, in a pattern followed by recent presidencies, all are being maintained, if not expanded, and thus more firmly cemented into place for future presidents to use. Wherever you fall on the political spectrum, you are likely to strongly oppose some major decisions of some future presidents. So it shouldn’t be hard to envision some pretty undesirable consequences that might flow from presidential power that increasingly approaches the absolute.

Our television news and newspapers don’t seem terribly interested in this story, despite scraping its surface with reports on the many “czars” Obama has appointed or lectures on the importance of renewing, or only marginally amending, the PATRIOT Act. And Congress seems, if possible, even less interested. That’s not so surprising, given that we’ve replaced the three branches of government with the two parties, so that at any given time roughly half the members of Congress take as their leader a president who is theoretically supposed to execute the will of Congress. And the other half usually obey their party’s “leaders” in Congress, whose primary interest is in electing one of their own as the next president. Both parties continue to value presidential power itself either for its uses in the present, or for when their candidate is elected. Everyone wants to inherit the imperial presidency, not constrain it.

Under these circumstances, bills to create commissions investigating presidential abuses, to place a judicial check on claims of “state secrets,” limit the use of presidential signing statements, or to allow more than eight members of Congress to be given “security” briefings by the executive branch prove not to be priorities for either party.

These days, the old-fashioned idea of checking executive abuses of existing laws through the issuance of subpoenas or by impeachment is, in Washington, widely considered a scandalous proposition. Congress impeached a judge this year who had groped his employees, but Jay Bybee, who signed secret memos purporting to legalize aggressive war and torture, and who now holds a lifetime seat on the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, is protected from such a step by his recent membership in the executive branch (and the displeasure Fox News would express toward his impeachment).

In April, Senator Patrick Leahy, chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, asked Bybee to testify, and the judge refused, just as many of his former colleagues in the Bush administration had in 2007 and 2008. Leahy may be unwilling to follow up by issuing a subpoena that even the new Department of Justice might refuse to enforce. The current department, for instance, allowed the White House Counsel to negotiate partial compliance with a House Judiciary Committee subpoena by former presidential advisor Karl Rove. And if Leahy is like most members of Congress, he will not even consider the option of using the Capitol Police to enforce a subpoena himself – something that no committee has done in 75 years.

All Power to the President

Any quick survey of the powers the presidency now claims would have to include the power to make laws, the power to make wars, the power to spend money, the power to make treaties, the power to grant immunity for crimes, the power to operate in secrecy, the power to spy without warrants, the power to detain without charge, and the power to torture.

Laws are still made by Congress, but they can be rewritten via signing statements; that is, statements announcing a president’s intention to violate particular sections of the very bill he is signing into law. Neither Congress nor President Obama has thrown out all of Bush’s extensive signing statements that did indeed alter laws. In fact, Obama has announced that his subordinates will review his predecessor’s signing statements only as the need arises.

This policy might please those imagining that the Obama administration will always make the right decision about whether to maintain or reject a Bush-made amendment to a law, but it does nothing to strip the presidency of the power to use the mechanism of the signing statement to re-make or amend or alter new laws. As it happens, Obama has already published his own law-making signing statements.

Presidents now also routinely determine national policy through executive orders and, in doing so, run the country out of the White House rather than through departments headed by officials approved by Congress. They also increasingly dictate a legislative agenda to Congress – and both members of Congress and members of the public generally accept without comment or opposition that inversion of our constitutional system. And then there are the secret memos.

In those secret memos, Bush’s lawyers in the Department of Justice dutifully “legalized” numerous illegal acts, including aggressive war and torture. Despite years of public back-and-forth between the White House and the Congress over the question of whether to ban torture, any act of complicity in torture was already a felony in the U.S. code under the Anti-Torture Act, which enforced the Convention Against Torture signed by President Ronald Reagan. However, the secret Justice Department memos were taken as the final word in legality, no matter what the law said.

Obama has directed the Justice Department not to prosecute those at the highest levels responsible for producing those memos, though he has permitted consideration – whether seriously intended or not – of the possibility of prosecuting a handful of low-ranking staffers who strayed beyond the illegal policies outlined in the memos. Not only does this bestow immunity on the most prominent criminals, reversing the approach – starting at the top – that the U.S. took at the Nuremburg war crimes trials after World War II, but it has the potential to create a terrifying precedent for the future. If a president can use his justice department to legalize a crime simply by asking a lawyer to write a memo, then who can doubt that a president has something approaching absolute power?

Presidents, not Congress, do indeed make wars now, whether or not they consult Jay Bybee’s memo on the subject. They make wars without congressional declarations of war, using instead vague bills to maintain a pretense of congressional involvement – and then they don’t even comply with the terms outlined in those authorizations. Illegal (as well as unconstitutional) as they may be, these wars can be expanded into apparently permanent occupations that include the construction of gigantic military bases from which additional wars may be launched. In the process, mercenaries often take the place of soldiers, and as “private contractors” they then operate even further from congressional oversight or the law.

To invade Iraq, President Bush spent money not appropriated for that purpose. He also gave himself the power to transfer money into “black budgets” beyond the purview of all but a few members of Congress, and so use it for secret tasks signed off on by his officials. Of course, massive secret budgets under the control of the president are nothing new, though they’ve grown through the years. Neither are they constitutional or sustainable.

On October 6th, the leaders of the two parties met with President Obama and, by Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid’s account, let him know that he could end, decrease, maintain, or escalate the war in Afghanistan and Pakistan as he saw fit. The Senate had voted the previous week not to call on war commander Stanley McChrystal for public testimony about that ongoing war until after the president determines his war policy, which of course means a war policy for all of us. Two days later, in a surprising flicker of dissent, House Appropriations Committee Chairman David Obey released a statement suggesting that, contrary to everything he’d said for years, he recognizes that Congress has the power to choose not to fund those wars and thereby to end them.

As his presidency was winding down, George W. Bush concluded an unofficial treaty (though it was called a Status of Forces Agreement) with the government of U.S.-occupied Iraq for three more years of war there without feeling the slightest need for it to be ratified by the Senate. Ever since, the U.S. military has actually violated the terms of that document, while its key commanders continued to publicly state their intention to remain in Iraq beyond the end of 2011, a clear violation of the agreement. In the meantime, this White House has used the treaty as cover for an ongoing illegal occupation of Iraq with, at this point, 120,000 U.S. troops and tens of thousands of private contractors.

Is Congress Broken?

When many feared that Bush might pardon his subordinates for crimes he had himself authorized, the consensus among members of Congress and scholars was that he could, in fact, do such a thing. In some ways what both Bush and Obama have actually done is worse. With a big assist from Congress in the form of bills like the Military Commissions Act and the FISA Amendments Act, they have worked to grant immunity for crimes without even naming the criminals or revealing what they have done. Obama’s Department of Justice is now arguing, appealing, or re-appealing in various court cases to keep secret the abuses of government officials and corporations involved in torture and warrantless spying. Recently, the Justice Department even argued that, when it comes to denying information to a court or the public, telecommunication corporations must be considered a part of the executive branch of the federal government, and earlier this year the administration threatened the British government with an end to intelligence sharing if it revealed evidence of torture.

President Obama announced that he will only claim the right to hide information from a court on the grounds that important “state secrets” are involved after careful review by lawyers at the Department of Justice. This may be an improvement over the Bush years – not exactly a hard standard to reach – but notably this decision still cedes not an ounce of power to any branch other than the executive, even as Obama’s lawyers make radical “state secrets” claims in attempts to block entire court cases, rather than over particular pieces of information.

While this president is ceding modest amounts of territory claimed by the previous one, he is ceding nothing when it comes to presidential power itself. For example, the president said he would release White House visitor logs (as the Bush administration had not), just not those already recorded, including the ones that held records of the visits of deal-making health insurance executives, nor any future logs that he thinks would endanger “national security.” That offers change of a sort, however modest, but leaves it entirely in the president’s hands to decide which logs to release.

This administration has indeed released some of the secret memos that Bush’s Department of Justice used to justify torture and never shared with the public, but only when compelled by courts. The Justice Department has, in fact, fought fiercely against their release and has redacted significant sections of them before making them public.

Bush claimed for the presidency the power to detain people without charge or legal process – and then used it. Obama stood in front of the U.S. Constitution in the National Archives in Washington and asserted the same power, in violation of the right of habeas corpus found in that torn and tattered document. Director of Central Intelligence Leon Panetta and presidential advisor David Axelrod have similarly made clear that the president still claims the power to engage in “harsh interrogation techniques” but chooses not to use it. Torture in this way has been transformed from a crime into a policy choice, with the intended message apparently being that we can stop torture temporarily by choosing to elect Democrats. This is perilous territory.

Perhaps presidents simply cannot be expected to give back powers gained by the executive branch, but shouldn’t we expect Congress to work to take them back on our behalf? When Alberto Gonzales resigned as attorney general, he did so because a rapidly growing list of members of Congress signed onto a one-sentence bill directing the House Judiciary Committee to investigate possible grounds for his impeachment. Such an approach toward Judge Jay Bybee could begin to restore the power of Congress to assert itself in other areas as well, while pressuring the Justice Department to enforce the law, and potentially making public a great deal of information through the subpoenas involved in any impeachment hearing, which does not permit claims of “executive privilege.” Information subpoenaed in an impeachment hearing must be produced, or the failure to produce it can become another impeachable offense.

Many of us probably consider our current president a much nicer guy than our local congressional representative. That doesn’t change the fact that influencing a president, or even a senator, via grassroots pressure is infinitely more difficult than influencing a member of the House of Representatives.

This is not a new discovery. After all, isn’t this, in part, why the House was given the power of the purse and the power of impeachment? Being closer to the ground, that body is, by its nature, going to be more amenable to democratic pressure and direction. If we want once again to have a real hand in making our nation’s policies, our best shot – admittedly still a distinctly uphill course – is to focus on the person who represents us in the House.

Unfortunately, we have to compel each of them to do something they have come to collectively fear: taking back the power originally bestowed on them and not on behalf of their party, but of their branch of government, of the Constitution to which they’ve sworn an oath, and of the proper sovereigns of this nation: we the people. Otherwise the chief legacy of the Obama years will, like those of his immediate predecessors, be the slide from republic into empire and the continuing growth of an imperial presidency.

David Swanson served as press secretary for Kucinich for President in 2004, runs the AfterDowningStreet.org website, and is the creator of Impeachbybee.org. His new book is Daybreak: Undoing the Imperial Presidency and Forming a More Perfect Union (Seven Stories Press). Visit his website. He is now touring the country for the book. You can find out when the tour will be in your town by clicking here.

Copyright © 2009 David Swanson

American government under the Constitution was supposedly meant to work as follows: Congress, staying within delegated powers and the Bill of Rights, passes laws; the president executes the laws; and the courts sort out ensuing wrangles. This plan ran aground rather early—the 1798 Alien and Sedition Acts, for example—which raises at least two possibilities: 1) The Federalist movement systematically misrepresented its project or 2) the framers’ well-meant “design” fell short of their goals. Figuring this out is difficult, with original sin, human nature, foreign complications, and more tangling up the causal chain.

Even so, the Constitution—read anywhere near its apparent intent—might be worth hanging onto; but how can we get such a reading? Enter a new crop of “conservative” legalists to offer us one under the rubric of “originalism.”

For this crop of presidentialists, which includes John C. Yoo, Roger J. Delahunty, David Addington, Jay S. Bybee, and Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, originalism centers on the Unitary Executive Theory (UET)—a bizarre doctrine of presidential infallibility allegedly prefigured by Alexander Hamilton. Under the UET, America ’s president is utterly sovereign in his sphere and sole judge of his own powers.

The merest glance at America ’s founding suggests that no one really wanted full-bore elective despotism. Nonetheless, American presidentialists apparently find just that in the terms “war powers” and “commander-in-chief,” and in presidential dominance of foreign affairs. Yet their forebear Hamilton conceded that in war the president has “nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces, as first General and Admiral of the Confederacy” (Federalist 69).

Presidentialists take John Marshall’s comment, in Congress, that the president is our “sole organ of communication” with other nations as entailing lots of power. And always, presidents assert powers and store up precedents. Presidentialists turn presidential duties, chores, and everyday practices into powers, and strong figures have built the office. In the Mexican War (1846–48), President James Polk established the practical precedent of maneuvering Congress into war. But it was Abraham Lincoln, above all, who asserted immeasurable war powers belonging (mostly) to the president, by combining the commander-in-chief clause with the president’s job of enforcing the laws. Of this, legal historian Raoul Berger writes in Executive Privilege: “[W]hen nothing is added to nothing the sum remains nothing.” But success succeeds, and later presidents— Richard Nixon and George W. Bush among them—have eagerly wrapped themselves in Lincoln ’s mantle of effectively suspending the Constitution to save the country.

After Lincoln, presidential war powers rested up until 1898, when President William McKinley wielded them overseas. (McKinley issued a virtual ultimatum to Spain over Cuba a month before Congress declared war.) Theodore Roosevelt thought he could do anything not prohibited, at home and abroad, thereby neatly reversing the premise on which the Constitution was sold. Woodrow Wilson, too, had large views, but in 1917–1918 amiably shared with Congress the power of treading liberty under foot (conscription, for example), albeit with no new doctrines, merely existing bad ones.

Worse luck, in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Co. (1936), conservative Supreme Court Justice George Sutherland fancied that during our revolution, George III’s prerogative powers somehow lighted on the union, hovering, extra-constitutionally, above successive Congresses, descending finally on the presidency. Berger deconstructed Curtiss-Wright, underscoring the break with England and the resulting institutional discontinuity. Sutherland’s opinion stands, approvingly cited by UE theorists.

As Berger notes, Sutherland championed “a theory of inherent presidential power over foreign relations.” Berger quotes Louis Henkin, who adds that Sutherland’s assertion “carves a broad exception in the historic conception . . . never questioned and explicitly reaffirmed in the Tenth Amendment, that the federal government is one of enumerated powers only.”

Presidential power made great strides under Franklin Roosevelt, before and during World War II. FDR’s domestic emergencies and his wartime operations added much to the office. The Cold War extended these power-accumulations into an indefinite and interesting future.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (1952), during the Korean War, reflected existing realities. Briefly, President Harry Truman, citing war powers, seized the steel industry to end a strike. People across the political spectrum, from organized labor to Republican Senator Robert Taft, denounced the action. The Supreme Court dodged the issue, holding that presidential powers did not go quite as far as Truman thought.

Bottomless Well of Power

Presidentialists take “The executive power shall be vested” (Article II) for a bottomless well. They see the specific duties mentioned as additional grants of power open to further (perhaps tortured) interpretation. They find further “inherent powers” arising from international law and Marshall’s sole organhood, and read the oath—“faithfully execute the office” and “preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution”—as allowing the president to violate laws in defense of the Constitution. Yet the charge that the president “take care that the laws be faithfully executed”(Article II, Section 3) seems to prohibit such maneuvers, although presidents have bent the words to their purposes, as when Lincoln “combined” them with the commander-in-chief provision.

Presidential lawyers aggregate or separate clauses to widen power. Political scientist Richard M. Pious writes in American Presidency that presidential lawyers, construing congressional powers strictly, view “all remaining functions, powers, and duties [as] exercised by the president under doctrines of inherent powers, resulting powers, sovereign powers, and inclusions”—along with emergency and national-security powers. Finally, presidents—as a branch of government—assert a right to interpret the Constitution. Pious shows minimal respect for these notions, commenting that recent, barely elected presidents have felt a need to exploit their “legal” opportunities.

From 1947 on, anticommunist crusading fostered right-wing presidentialism. Meanwhile, on other issues the Supreme Court provoked a reaction toward strict construction. Since that was quite incompatible with Cold War policies, something had to give; when it did, right-wing presidentialists hijacked strict construction, reinventing it as absolutist originalism. Midway through this journey, Richard Nixon’s cries of “national security”—to becloud the Watergate affair—rang like a fire bell in the day.

In his online paper “Rethinking Presidential Power—The Unitary Executive and the George W. Bush Presidency,” political scientist Christopher S. Kelley writes that, frustrated by ongoing congressional “aggression” against executive power—the War Powers Act of 1973 and congressional “interference” with federal bureaucracies—lawyers in the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel cobbled UE theory together in the 1980s. During war—as everyone “knows”—the feds may freeze the Bill of Rights, provided they thaw it out later. What seems new in UE theory is the assertion that the president is sole judge of his powers, with Congress and courts excluded from inquiring into executive undertakings. (Nixon claimed to be sole judge of executive privilege.) This would seem a recipe for tyranny.

UE theorists speak of constitutional text, structure, and history; but their postmodern textual maneuvers, their homemade structures, and their lawyer’s history live on the edge of sudden implosion. In a 2003 paper, “Judicial Review and the War on Terrorism,” John Yoo, who had worked in the Bush 43 Office of Legal Counsel, asserted that while the judicial process exists for issues involving federalism, none exists for issues arising from war. He thereby nodded toward UE theorists’ oft-professed belief in states’ rights while separating all such “domestic” matters from important presidential activities. Yoo praised “the war powers system we have today in which the President initiates war, Congress funds it, and the courts remain aloof.” Further, the president may designate citizens as enemies, with no further proof or process needed.

Elsewhere, in “The President’s Constitutional Authority to Conduct Military Operations against Terrorist Organizations and the Nations that Harbor or Support Them,” Yoo and Roger Delahunty examine Article II of the Constitution where they see the mere words “the executive power shall be vested in a President”—the high-toned “Vesting Clause”—as unveiling a mighty fortress: “The executive power” (my emphasis). The authors assign the president “all of the executive power” and “full control“ of the military, adducing his power to “repel sudden attacks,” commending his “speed and energy.” Predictably, they hold that Congress has only powers “herein granted” and “enumerated,” while the president has “all other unenumerated powers.” Backed by “historical practice” and “precedent,” “the President alone” decides war and peace. This is textualism?

The shades of Wilson, FDR, and Truman must be smiling. Few non-White House supremacists would read texts so liberally. A whole generation of conservative constitutionalists now surpasses Earl Warren in creative writing. Some conservatives foment empire, militarism, surveillance, and presidential hubris through their own juridical and judicial activism.

Such are the raw materials of UET, but there are a few more points of interest.

Unenumerated Powers Don’t Exist

1. Presidents reach for “all other unenumerated powers”; but by a well-known canon of construction, powers not enumerated are not “granted” and do not exist. The claim assumes the very thing to be proven. In Executive Privilege, Berger writes that, “lacking an ‘enumerated’ power, action is illegal” and observes that “faithfully executed” implies presidential accountability to Congress. Further, “executive privilege” (withholding information) asserts a power the King had already lost. He adds that “the Framers vested many prerogatives of the Crown in Congress and denied them to the President.”Berger remarks on the “meager scope” of the presidency’s projected powers: “The words ‘executive power’ were thus no more than a label designed to differentiate presidential from legislative functions, and to describe the powers thereafter conferred and enumerated. To derive additional authority from this descriptive label is to pervert the design of the Framers. . . .” Further: “Madison and [James] Wilson stated that the rights of ‘war and peace,’ enjoyed by the King, were not included in the ‘executive powers.’ Patently, the Framers were determined to cut all roots of the executive power in the royal prerogative.” Absent royal prerogative, the U.S. president would seem to be constitutionally impotent as far as finding and beginning his own wars goes. Practical politics made the office what it is today. In An Inquiry into the Principles and Policy of the Government of the United States (1814), John Taylor of Caroline, a serious strict constructionist, characterized the presidency as driving us toward “force and fraud” and “monarchy, revolution, and an iron government.” Election was an insufficient guard; for this reason the states put their executives under severe restrictions.
2. Presidential lawyers dig out generalities about emergencies from Hamilton ’s Federalist essays but little on who holds the emergency powers. Is it Congress? As an executive officer under George Washington, Hamilton “discovered” what prerogative powers he could, and presidentialists get more mileage from this Hamilton. Given two Hamiltons, his arguments are somewhat suspect. (On prerogative powers in the Constitution, present or absent, see Forrest McDonald’s Novus Ordo Seclorum: The Intellectual Origins of the Constitution.)
   Precedent Yields No Right
3. UE theorists dwell on text, practice, and precedent. But whether successful usurpations—some large, some microscopic—amend the Constitution is not proven. Presidents have gotten away with things. As Berger points out, presidential stonewalling, which Congress has resisted for two centuries, yields no “right” of executive privilege. Yet much rests on the larger implications of executive privilege where successfully asserted. In Construction Construed and Constitutions Vindicated (1820), Taylor noted that the Stuarts collected precedents “because, successive encroachments terminate in conquest.” Moreover: “precedents, both good and bad, ought to have weight. . . . But discrimination is as applicable to precedents, as to any other species of evidence . . . [and] no improvement in civil government has ever been made, or can be preserved, but by a subversion of precedents, until a form is discovered incapable of corruption.”
4. UE theorists make much of the president’s job of repelling invasions of American soil. That this seldom happens is, for them, beside the point. Two much-mooted cases—Pearl Harbor and 9/11—drew forth no repelling. In 1846 President Polk was not repelling but was instead provoking. Nor was the Confederate attack on Fort Sumter, after months of talk, sudden, unexpected, or repelled. Given time, advocates might find some repelling, and so what? If the president failed to repel, defenders would still defend. Where is the mighty grant of “executive power”? Presidentialists hope to convince us that should a president ever defend American soil, he would be “making war,” thereby proving—apparently—that he may make war anywhere, anytime, at will. In “Emergency Powers and the Militia Acts,” legal scholar Stephen I. Vladeck does not concede a presidential power of repelling. Instead, such actions have rested on the Militia Acts of 1792, 1795, and 1807, and their successors, that is, on delegation by Congress. This greatly reduces what presidents can reasonably obtain from repelling. Indeed, they just break even with the states, which may “engage in war” when actually invaded.
5. For UE theory, “separation of powers” works overtime, albeit rather cynically. Berger writes: “the separation of powers does not create or grant power; it only protects powers conferred by the Constitution. . . . [T]o argue from the bare fact of a tripartite system of government, without preliminary inquiry into the scope of each of the three powers, is like invoking the magic of numerology.”In any case, classic separation took “checks and balances” rather seriously. But if the president has his own sovereign sphere, how is he checked—or balanced.This brings us to John Taylor’s attack on “spherical sovereignty” in Construction Construed. (All emphasis has been added.) In McCulloch v. Maryland (1819), Chief Justice John Marshall sustained the supremacy of Congress in its sphere of action. Taylor agreed that “‘sphere’ conveys an idea of something limited,” but wondered “how this word . . . can be converted into a substantive uncircumscribed, by the help of the adjective ‘sovereign.’” He continues: “If the sovereignty of the spheres means any sovereignty at all, it supersedes the sovereignty of the people. . . .”Now Taylor is not objecting to spheres, but to sovereignty anywhere, since American principles demand actual delegation by real principals to real (and mere) agents. No one has “inherent” powers.Taylor continues: “There is no phrase in the constitution which even insinuates, that the actual divisions of power should be altered or impaired by incidental or implied powers.” Further: “Individual spheres or departments are easily persuaded, like Kings, that a subordination to themselves would be better for a nation, than the occasional collisions produced by a division and limitation of power.” And here was the danger: “A jurisdiction, limited by its own will, is an unlimited jurisdiction.”Taylor thought “occasional collisions” better than sovereign institutions. Rather than making Congress, executive, or court supreme in some realm, the Constitution created “co-ordinate political departments, intended as checks upon each other, only invested with defined and limited powers, and subjected to the sovereignty . . . of the people. . . . ”The Court’s new-fangled “spherical sovereignty” overthrew the division of powers: “A supreme power able to abolish collisions, is also able to abolish checks, and there can be no checks without collisions.” In America we “have preferred checks and collisions, to a dictatorship of one department. . . .” Under “the concurrent power of taxation,” Congress and the states “may each pass a law, both of which may be constitutional, and yet these laws may clash with, or impede each other. . . . For this clashing the constitution makes no provision.”

   According to Taylor , the Court was unearthing prerogative powers for Congress, including one to “remove all obstacles to its action.” Marshall sought “to unite an extension of power with an apparent adherence to the words of the constitution.” Under this dodge, “it was necessary to hook every implied, to some delegated power. . . .” This is still the practice of a continental state that micromanages the life-world under color of regulating commerce and passes worldwide military empire off as “defense.”

   On Taylor ’s reading, no branch derives sovereign powers from idealized separateness. Powers, where they exist, were delegated by living Americans, not by some cloud-borne eighteenth-century paragraphs “mediating” sovereignty to federal departments.

6. UET’s “flexible system for going to war” (Yoo’s words) seems better fitted for finding and having wars than for actual defense of American soil. Here, where sovereignty and war powers conjure and conspire, UE theorists build on Marshall ’s gutting of enumerated powers and Sutherland’s “inherent” prerogatives; but Taylor whipped them before they were born, even on war powers:
   

   . . . [T]he case of war is specially provided for by the federal constitution, because the federal government, as having no sovereignty, could not other wise have declared it. . . . As the powers of making war and peace were necessary, it became necessary also to provide for them, not as emanations from the principle of a sovereignty in governments, but as delegated powers.. .. No powers in relation to war are derived from . . . sovereignty in governments under our system; and none can be justly inferred from the conclusions of the writers upon the laws of nations. . . .”[Emphasis supplied.]

   Presidential “signing statements,” grounded in UET, proclaim a departmental “reading” of what the president is signing into “law.” Unwilling to veto, President Bush says he will enforce the law (or not) as he sees fit. The attempt came before the name. In President: The Office and Powers, constitutional scholar Edward S. Corwin wrote of its having been undertaken in 1946–1947: “For a court to vary its interpretation of an act of Congress in deference to something said by the President at the time of signing would be . . . to endow him with a legislative power not shared by Congress.”

   Signing statements aim at influencing gullible jurists and, ultimately, at excluding the courts from even their normally feckless protection of liberty during alleged wars. (On this, see Richard E. Eliel’s “Freedom of Speech,” American Political Science Review, November 1924.)

Sovereignty, Unknown Powers, Strict Construction

If we forsake “originalism,” as we probably should, we need not give up strict construction. Any serious perspective must begin with contemporary comparisons of the Constitution as advertised with the Constitution as put into practice. Taylor, Spencer Roane, and others heard certain promises in the ratifying conventions and saw them broken once the promising parties were in office. Their critique rose from an unavoidable contrast. (For how quickly the Federalists’ real program emerged, see The Journal of William Maclay, U.S. senator from Pennsylvania , 1789–91, available online and in book form.)

In Construction Construed, Taylor went to the fundamentals. He began with “powers of sovereignty and supremacy [that] may be relished, because they tickle the mind with hopes and fears. . . .” Yet “the term ‘sovereignty,’ was sacrilegiously stolen from the attributes of God, and impiously assumed by Kings . . . [and] aristocracies and republicks have claimed the spoil.” In any case, the “idea of investing servants with sovereignty, and that of investing ourselves with a sovereignty over other nations, were equally preposterous.” (Now, of course, we do both.)

“Sovereignty” was “neither fiduciary nor capable of limitation.” In America, we “eradicate[d] it by establishing governments invested with specified and limited powers,” under which “the people or the states retain all the powers they have not bestowed . . . [and] ungranted rights remain also with the grantors . . . the people.” This canon of constitutional interpretation, by which powers “not granted” are seen as not granted—hence nonexistent—failed to impress Marshall and others. With more experience of the Constitution, we might judge Marshall wrong.

Taylor declined to see the words “To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States”( Article I, Section 8, 18) as a charter of unknown powers; Marshall, however, saw “necessary and proper” as licensing numberless convenient and apposite means, and alongside spherical sovereignty, this was his key innovation.

Lacking certain desired powers, Congress could not simply grasp them by calling them means “necessary and proper” for fulfilling actually enumerated powers. Before the Revolution, Taylor noted in Construction Construed, Parliament contended for unlimited means of war: “The colonies replied, that it would be more absurd to limit powers, and yet concede unlimited means for their execution . . . .” Marshall ’s repositioning of “means” undid the whole idea of enumeration. Taylor wrote: “As ends may be made to beget means, so means may be made to beget ends, until the co-habitation shall rear a progeny of unconstitutional bastards.”

Later court decisions have awarded the president the same “necessary and proper” latitude that it earlier gave Congress. The process is cumulative, but if the doctrine was unsound when aiding Congress, it remains so when fattening the executive.

Marshall undermined American political reasoning, said Taylor , “by inferring the powers of sovereignty from a delegated power; as the power of establishing banks, from the power of taxation . . . .” But reasoning from international law to American government was a mistake. Where foreign threats existed, “the constitution . . . disregarding . . . the laws of nations, assigns the power . . . to a department [Congress], not as being sovereign, but as being a trustee . . . [which] alone possesses a right to involve the United States in war; and no other department, nor any individual, has a better right to do so, than a constable has to bring the same calamity upon England. As the laws of nations cannot deprive congress of any power . . . so they cannot invest congress or any other department, with any power not bestowed by the constitution. . . . [Those laws] contemplate the powers of declaring war and making peace, as residing in an executive department; but the constitution divides them, and does not intrust the president with either” (emphasis supplied).

Contesting institutional sovereignty derived from international law, Taylor aimed right at UET theorists’ favorite things: the war powers and their location in the system.

Can Amendment Rid Us of This Turbulent Office?

Taylor ’s point is, very simply, that if the government has some general “sovereignty,” then it, or some branch of it, is the final judge of its actions. If the government is not sovereign, then the unknowably vast powers for war, emergencies, and so on must remain with the people, as individuals, families, or communities—a disturbing thought, even for believers in such powers. Such a theoretical placement might lead to individual civil disobedience and nullification by communities. Short of such drastic experiments, are there any constitutional cures for unitary-executive disease? Perhaps so. This brings us to our only remaining article of faith, the amending power.

Talk about unknown powers! We seem entirely free to abolish the executive in all its unitarity. Amendment, however, would require a train of disasters irrefutably stemming from that office. We have the disasters; the historical dice have been cast, but where will they land?

This article originally appeared in The Freeman – January 2007, Vol. 57, Issue 1.

In reading the Constitution, we can plainly see that Congress possesses the power “to regulate commerce with foreign nations, to raise and support armies, to grant letters of marque and reprisal, to provide for the common defense,” and even “to declare war.” Congress shares, with the President, the power to make treaties and to appoint ambassadors. As for the Executive, the President is assigned only two powers relating to foreign affairs; commander-in-chief of the armed forces, and the power to receive ambassadors.

The United States Constitution, which is the supreme law of the land in our country, delegates the power to declare war to the Congress and the power to wage war to the President. What that means is that only the Congress, as representatives of the People and of the States, can determine whether or not the nation goes to war. If the People, through Congress, decide that the nation shall go to war, the President then, and only then, has the authority to wage it.

Unless the country is being invaded, if the congress does not declare war against another country, the president is constitutionally barred from waging it, no matter how much he desires to do so. This is, again, shown clearly in the following statements:

“As the executive cannot decide the question of war on the affirmative side, neither ought it to do so on the negative side, by preventing the competent body from deliberating on the question.”
- Thomas Jefferson

“The executive has no right, in any case, to decide the question, whether there is or is not cause for declaring war.”
- James Madison

Presidential orders, even those issued as commander-in-chief, are subject to restrictions imposed by Congress. A Congressional declaration of war, for example, limits Presidential powers, narrows the focus of the action, and implies, or clearly stipulates, a precise end-point to the conflict. Like it or not, the Constitution is clear, and the only way it can be changed is through the procedure for amendments as outlined in the Constitution.

All Presidents that have waged war without a Congressional declaration, including Presidents Truman, Johnson, Clinton and Bush, have broken the law; the law specifically stated in the Constitution; thereby conducting themselves like dictators, albeit democratically elected, in order to determine the future of foreign people and nations.

In addition, the fact that Congress is not permitted under the Constitution to transfer the war-declaring power to a President has been repeatedly ignored. Only Congress can declare war, if we are inclined to follow the rule of law. Thus, those members of Congress who’ve voted to do so are just as guilty, in violating the law, as Presidents have been in their act of accepting, rather than refusing, this illegal transfer of power.

To add insult to injury, many acts of war by our country have cited United Nations resolutions as justification. Ignoring the Constitution, while citing the UN as a justification for war, has shown us the callous disregard that our political rulers have had for the restraints written in the Constitution.

The framers deliberately wanted to make war difficult to embark upon without public legislative debate; thus, they intentionally kept this power out of the hands of the executive branch. It is logical to assume that they never would have dreamed of a President with such powers, or of the possibility that an international governmental body would have influence over our foreign policy; telling us when we should or should not enter into armed conflict.

As a result of our multiple undeclared wars, millions of people are dead. Since just 1999, United States’ forces have attacked at least three more nations. Each time, a President has either started the war outright, or allowed Congress to relinquish its power to decide.

Without a proper declaration or war, without public debate, without the People deciding whether or not to engage in conflict, no war is legal, moral, or just! This is exactly what our nation’s founders warned against when creating our government. Most had just left behind a monarchy where the power to declare and wage war rested on the decision of one person, the King of England. It is this they most wished to avoid.

Some have argued that the war-declaring power comes from the sum of constitutional provisions dealing with war. Abraham Lincoln’s well-known act of combining the commander-in-chief clause with the clause authorizing the President to enforce the laws is a misbegotten form of this claim.

Resolutions authorizing the Executive to initiate force are not declarations of war, however, and this point is of the greatest concern to our nation; these resolutions transfer the constitutionally-mandated Congressional authority to declare wars to the executive branch. These resolutions have told Presidents that they, and they alone, have the authority to determine when, where, why, and how war will be declared, waged, and completed.

Numerous bills have been passed by Congress, merely asking the Executive to give a courtesy report to the People, through Congress, sometime after war has begun to let us know what is happening.

But, in an age where warfare can destroy nations and people in weeks rather than years, any resolution requesting a courtesy call after conflict begins effectively hands to the Executive the dictatorial powers to declare, wage, and complete wars without the input of Congress and the People.

However, as the Supreme Court affirmed long ago, the Constitution does not permit one branch of government to delegate its powers to another branch. Thus, Congressional resolutions authorizing the President to decide whether or not to invade a foreign nation are null and void under the Constitution; leaving the President with the illegal dictatorial power to both declare and wage war.

President Clinton’s bombing of Sudan and Afghanistan on the eve of his indictment ended a Taliban plan to expel Osama bin Laden from Afghanistan. His bombing of Yugoslavia resulted in thousands of deaths, and his bombing of Baghdad on the eve of his impeachment hardly reassured anyone of a just and balanced American foreign policy.

President Bush chose to ignore the United States Constitution by ordering our military into Iraq. His son has done the same. President Reagan ignored the Constitution by attacking Libya, while Presidents Kennedy and Johnson did so by sending troops to Vietnam.

The continued bombing, blockade, and subsequent invasion of Iraq has been carried out by three Presidents and Congresses led by both major political parties. The result? The deaths of well-over a million innocents.

In launching illegal wars, these, and other Presidents sent the world the following message: While the United States is a nation that has a Constitution which expressly limits the President’s power regarding warfare; in practice, our system of government gives the Executive the power to ignore the law and exercise dictatorial powers instead.

Michael Boldin [send him email] is the founder of the Tenth Amendment Center.

Testimony before the House Judiciary Committee, July 25, 2008

Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of this Committee, on which I was privileged to serve throughout my eight years as a Member of the House of Representatives, it is an honor to appear today to speak on the importance of the separation of powers in the federal government as a tool for protecting the people’s liberties. Many vital issues confront our nation, but few are more important than repairing and maintaining the constitutional bulwarks that guarantee individual liberty and limit government power.

Mr. Chairman, today I appear as a private citizen, and also as a former Member of this Committee and as a once-again practicing attorney. I am also honored to be serving as the presidential nominee of the Libertarian Party.

It is axiomatic that no matter how much power government has, it always wants more. While the executive branch under George W. Bush has taken this truism to new heights, it is not unique in its quest for power. Unfortunately, the other branches of government have failed to do enough to maintain the constitutional balance. Particularly disturbing has been Congress’ recent reluctance, in the face of aggressive executive branch claims, to make the laws and ensure that the laws are properly applied. This failure has inhibited the operation of the separation of powers, necessary to provide the checks and balances which undergird our system of constitutional liberty.

CHECKS AND BALANCES

The Constitution employs several techniques to preserve our liberties and privacy. One is to limit federal authority to enumerated powers. Another is to explicitly restrict government power, most notably through the Bill of Rights. The Founders also used the basic structure of government to protect the people from abuse, relying upon federalism, dividing power between state and national governments, as well as the separation of powers within the federal government itself.

The latter concept goes back to ancient Greece and was explicated by such political philosophers as John Locke and most famously by Baron de Montesquieu, who was much studied by America’s Founders. Many countries have implemented the same principle, though with different government structures, ranging up to six branches in Germany. In the U.S. the Founders established the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. The result is intentional inefficiency: the three branches are expected to constantly check and balance each other.

For instance, James Madison declared in Federalist No. 51: “the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others.” He went on to explain that, “[i]n framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.” This means “the constant aim is to divide and arrange the several offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on the other.”

Despite the inevitable problems which will afflict any political system, the original constitutional scheme has worked extremely well. Although the relative power of the different branches has varied over time, checks and balances have always operated.

More than two centuries have passed, and the constitutional limits on both the legislative and judicial branches remain robust – at least in theory. The president appoints and the Senate confirms judges, for instance. Presidents veto legislation and administer the laws, while the judiciary assesses the constitutionality of and interprets statutes.

In contrast, however, the constitutional constraints on the executive branch have eroded, with some breaking down substantially or entirely. The process has been underway for many years, but has greatly accelerated since 2001. In particular, President Bush and his appointees have used his power as commander in chief—of the military, not American society, it should be noted—to disregard congressional authority and override explicit constitutional provisions. Indeed, since 9/11, the president has let few opportunities slip by without reminding us that he is not only commander in chief but also a “wartime president,” and to argue that this status justifies whatever new power he claims to possess and wishes to utilize.

The president’s authority is substantial, but limited by law. The Constitution directs him or her to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed.” However, Congress is vested with the sole power to legislate, thereby determining the laws to be executed. Moreover, the president’s administration of the law is constrained by the Bill of Rights, including the Fourth Amendment, which bars searches and seizures absent a warrant based on probable cause. Further, though the president by the nature of his office has a lead role in shaping foreign and military policy, the Constitution shares powers in these areas between the legislative and executive branches.

Since the nation’s founding, Congress and the executive have struggled for supremacy. The 20th Century witnessed a steady if irregular expansion of presidential authority, which has carried over into this first decade of the 21st Century. The role of the president as the military’s commander in chief has taken on increasing importance as it has been used to justify the aggrandizement of the executive’s authority at the expense of that of both Congress and the judiciary. The issue is not just an abstract struggle between different government officials. Rather, this expansion of presidential power has increasingly put the people’s liberties and privacy at risk.

WAR-MAKING POWERS
One of the most important expansions of executive authority has been transforming the president’s power to conduct a war into that of starting a war. Congress is vested with the sole power to declare, meaning to start, war; the Constitution’s framers explicitly intended to diverge from the British system and vest the authority to initiate war with the many in the legislature rather than the one in the executive. The Constitution also empowers Congress to create the military and enact rules governing both the military and the conduct of war. Although the constitutional convention changed the term from “make” to “declare” to allow the president to respond to a surprise attack, and the president’s authority to conduct war as commander in chief suggests that Congress cannot second guess his tactical judgments, he is to exercise all his powers within the larger framework created by the legislative branch.

Yet modern presidents increasingly assert their unilateral authority to bomb and invade other nations, without legislative approval, and to conduct military operations for years even after the original circumstances giving rise to a congressional authorization to use force have changed. This trend did not originate with the Bush administration, but has continued and grown under it. For instance, in 2002 President George W. Bush insisted that Congress not tie his hands, and refused to acknowledge the constitutional necessity of winning legislative approval to invade Iraq. Rather than make the decision for or against war, Congress transferred discretion to initiate war against Iraq to the president.

After launching the Iraq invasion in 2003 based on a 2002 congressionally-passed resolution to do so, the current administration has rejected the argument that a multi-year occupation violates Congress’ authorization of force, which legally controls the executive’s war objectives. The president also has resisted congressional oversight of its objectives and policies, which is an essential aspect of Congress’ authority. Although acknowledging that Congress controls the budgetary purse strings, the president and his aides have fought any attempt to condition appropriations—conveniently bundled in “emergency” supplementals in order to reduce the opportunity for legislative review.

EROSION OF LIBERTY

The administration has attempted to use the same commander in chief power, as well as Congress’ Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), approved after 9/11, to trump constitutional protections for civil liberties and privacy. Yet the Constitution does not create a national security exception to the Bill of Rights or separation of powers, and no member of Congress imagined that voting to authorize the use of force abroad simultaneously authorized the president to engage in unspecified and otherwise unconstitutional conduct at home. There is no basis for the argument the president’s authority as commander in chief in effect swallows and trumps the rest of the Constitution.

For instance, the administration undertook warrantless surveillance of Americans without court order or supervision. Conducted by the National Security Agency, the program was inaugurated shortly after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and was inaccurately dubbed the Terrorist Surveillance Program, since in fact it targeted American citizens with no reason to believe they were engaged in any actions involving terrorism. The eavesdropping directly violated even the relaxed warrant requirements of the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.

Under Republican control, Congress unashamedly refused to conduct serious inquiry into the obviously improper NSA surveillance program. Unfortunately, the GOP majority put partisan comity ahead of fidelity to the law and Constitution. Although more members of the Democratic majority, which took over in January 2007, indicated concern about administration lawlessness, this Congress recently caved in to administration demands and amended FISA to grant the government unprecedented power to surreptitiously spy on the phone calls and emails of American citizens in our own country, based on nothing more then a belief they are communicating with someone not in the U.S. The measure also granted immunity – retro-active and prospective — to telephone companies which aided government law-breaking.

Thus did a genuine need to modernize certain of FISA’s technical provisions—for example, to reverse the court interpretation that monitoring calls sent by modern routing mechanisms through the U.S., even though both parties were located abroad, required a court order—became an opportunity to greatly expand the law’s reach. The result is to make virtually every international call or email subject to monitoring without court oversight. Thereby carving out an entire class of communication from constitutional protection is a breathtaking decision with the potential to do enormous damage to the very meaning of the Fourth Amendment and to the essential foundation of limited government. This law also has effectively neutered the oversight role the Congress or the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court should play in this area.

Similarly extravagant has been the administration’s claimed right, as an adjunct of both the president’s constitutional warpowers and the AUMF, to designate American citizens arrested in America as well as alleged terrorists captured overseas as “enemy combatants” beyond the reach of the U.S. Constitution and courts. The detention of combatants captured in battle is a natural adjunct to war, but not the suspension of all constitutional and legislative oversight of the executive’s power to imprison anyone it claims to be a combatant for as long as it desires. The argument that the president has the unique power to suspend basic constitutional guarantees, including the “Great Writ” of habeas corpus, whereby a person has a fundamental right to be brought before a court to determine the lawfulness of his or her detention or deprivation, is particularly dangerous in the midst of a potentially endless “war” where the American homeland is considered to be a — and perhaps the chief — battlefield.

There is nothing in Article II of the Constitution which provides that the president is the military’s commander in chief, to suggest that he thereby gains the power to suspend any law and any constitutional provision at his discretion. Indeed, the very next section reminds the president that at all times he has a responsibility to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,” with no hint of an exception whenever he decides he is acting as commander in chief. In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (1952), the Supreme Court rejected a similar claim by the Truman administration — that the president’s powers as commander in chief allowed him to seize steel mills despite Congress’ refusal to authorize such an act.

Nor is it plausible that Congress believed that by authorizing military action in response to 9/11 it was empowering the president to deny American citizens their constitutional rights at home. Authorizing military action overseas does not logically mean authorizing every conceivable use of surveillance, arrest, and imprisonment by the federal government at home. Indeed, if the administration had believed this theory at the time, there would have been no reason for it to have proposed the Patriot Act, since all those powers, too, should have been included in the AUMF. Equally important, Congress itself only has the authority to suspend—and only if our country is invaded or faced with overt “Rebellion”—not eliminate, habeas corpus. Congress cannot authorize the president to limit that right in additional circumstances.

SIGNING STATEMENTS

Another example of a direct presidential assault on the separation of powers, and thus the constitutional structure undergirding our free society, are presidential signing statements. Throughout history, signing statements have been used to thank supporters, provide reasons for signing a bill or express satisfaction or displeasure with legislation passed by Congress. Presidents Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and Bill Clinton all used signing statements to express constitutional and other objections to legislation, influence judicial interpretation, and otherwise advance policy goals.

President George W. Bush has more aggressively – to an historically unprecedented degree — employed the presidential signing statement to challenge or deny effect to legislation that he considers unconstitutional, but nonetheless signs. As the Congressional Research Service reported last year, a much higher share of President Bush’s signing statements have contained a constitutional challenge, and they “are typified by multiple constitutional and statutory objections, containing challenges to more than 1,000 distinct provisions of the law.” This tactic, adds CRS, is “an integral part of the administration’s efforts to further its broad view of presidential prerogatives and to assert functional and determinative control over all elements of the executive decision making process.”

In scores of cases President Bush has claimed that legislation has improperly interfered with presidential authority. In a democracy, such assertions of power—most fundamentally the underlying failure to comply rather than the explanatory signing statement—do not happen in a vacuum. They affect the careful balance of power in our system of government. The executive branch is not free to unilaterally change that balance; our Constitution requires legislative and judicial involvement in lawmaking to ensure public debate and oversight and to guard against centralization of power.
Article I of the Constitution gives Congress the power to make the laws. Under Article II, the president has the duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. The Constitution also provides that if the president

objects to a proposed law, he can veto it. This gives Congress the chance to override his veto, enacting the law despite his opposition, or to sustain his veto, and then work to address the president’s objections. A president may also challenge a law he believes to be unconstitutional in court.

Instead, the current president, especially, has used signing statements, and a refusal to enforce the law, as a sub rosa form of unreviewable veto, usurping the power of Congress and aggrandizing the power of the executive.

EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE

Another tool of executive aggrandizement has been the doctrine of executive privilege. No where spelled out in the Constitution itself, the claim has been advanced by presidents starting with George Washington. The doctrine is most persuasively rooted in national security, but presidents often have more generally contended that confidentiality is necessary for the operation of the executive branch.
Although the argument at its core is not without force, executive privilege has become an all-purpose shield and boilerplate excuse to hide embarrassing and potentially incriminating information from Congress and the public. That a claim for executive privilege had to be balanced with other interests was evident in 1807 when Aaron Burr, on trial for treason, sued President Thomas Jefferson to produce a supposedly exculpatory letter. Chief Justice John Marshall rejected Jefferson’s argument that disclosure risked public safety and ordered the president to comply. In 1974 the climactic case of United States v. Nixon confronted President Richard M. Nixon’s attempt to use the claim of executive privilege to avoid having to turn over evidence of criminal misbehavior to Watergate special prosecutor Leon Jaworski. The Supreme Court unanimously acknowledged a generalized right of confidentiality, but ruled that this privilege must yield to other government interests, most notably the criminal process. The order that he yield up the tapes recording his Oval Office conversations led to his resignation.

Other presidents have relied on the doctrine to shield their operations from scrutiny. The Clinton administration avoided disclosure of the deliberations of the president’s health care reform task force because First Lady Hillary Clinton was considered to be a government employee under the relevant legislation. This admittedly strained interpretation allowed the courts to avoid ruling on the question of whether executive privilege applied to conversations between government officials and people outside of government.

As in other areas, the Bush administration has even more energetically sought to keep information about many of its activities, even those with no sensitive national security implications, from public view. For instance, the administration resisted a request for disclosure, based on legislation covering “advisory committees,” of the names of participants and results of discussions by members of the Vice President’s National Energy Policy Development Group. The administration lost in the lower courts, but was partially upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court, which sent the case back to the District Court for reconsideration. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals ultimately refused to order disclosure based on its interpretation of the relevant statute, based on the fact that several government officials served on the Group.

Elsewhere the administration’s case for secrecy has been more frivolous and less well received. For instance, the administration attempted to keep secret visitor logs detailing Christian leaders who visited the White House and vice president’s residence. Earlier this month the D.C. Circuit distinguished this case from the energy group decision and ruled that the logs were not the property of the White House—which took custody from the Secret Service (part of the Treasury Department) in order to thwart a request under the Freedom of Information Act—and ordered their release.

These cases centered on statutory interpretation. The Bush administration also has more directly used the doctrine of executive privilege to resist disclosures to Congress, even as part of investigations of potential executive wrong-doing. For instance, at a recent hearing of this Committee, Karl Rove refused to appear, based on advice of the White House Counsel, to discuss his role in possible meddling in Justice Department prosecutions. Last year White House Chief of Staff Josh Bolten and former White House Counsel Harriet Miers similarly refused to obey committee subpoenas to appear to discuss the firing of U.S. attorneys; the House voted to hold them in contempt.

The House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform has been investigating the White House’s involvement in the disclosure of Valerie Plame’s employment by the CIA. In June Chairman Henry Waxman pointed out to Attorney General Michael B. Mukasey that “In his interview with the FBI, Mr. Libby stated that it was ‘possible’ that Vice President Cheney instructed him to disseminate information about Ambassador Wilson’s wife to the press. This is a significant revelation and, if true, a serious matter. It cannot be responsibly investigated without access to the Vice President’s FBI interview.” However, in an echo of the Watergate controversies, Mukasey refused to comply, citing fear of “the chilling effect that compliance with the committee’s subpoena would have on future White House deliberations.” The White House cited executive privilege in refusing to turn over the FBI interview, even though the vice president’s chief of staff had been convicted of perjury.

In an extraordinary twist on the doctrine of executive privilege, the Bush administration announced last year that it would not allow any U.S. Attorney to pursue a contempt citation on behalf of Congress. By attempting to control federal employees who also are officers of the courts, the administration attempted to place itself beyond effective accountability by any person or institution. Mark Rozell of George Mason University termed this position “astonishing” and “a breathtakingly broad view of the president’s role in this system of separation of powers. What this statement is saying is the president’s claim of executive privilege trumps all.” Indeed, if sustained, Rozell added, this position will allow “the executive to define the scope and limits of its own powers.” As a result, the House has filed suit to enforce its subpoena, the first such lawsuit in history.

“STATE SECRETS” DOCTRINE

Another doctrine used by the executive branch to the detriment of the constitutional separation of powers is the so-called “state secrets privilege.” According to this doctrine, the executive branch refuses to release information in court cases on the grounds that disclosure would harm “national security.” First recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1953, the doctrine has been treated as well-nigh absolute by some judges.

In this case, like many others, there is an obvious basis for shielding sensitive information in extraordinary instances from public view, even to the detriment of a valid lawsuit. However, again, a legitimate doctrine has been twisted to frustrate cases that might expose government wrong-doing and executive misconduct. As a result, government accountability, and redress of wrongs suffered by individuals as the result of government action, have suffered greatly.

For instance, Khalid El-Masri filed a civil case against the U.S. government in a case involving “extraordinary rendition,” in which the government illegally detained Mr. El-Masri in a case of mistaken identity. The trial court judge accepted the government’s claimed “state secrets privilege,” which thwarted disclosures necessary to prosecute the case. A similar result was reached in a similar case by Canadian Maher Arar, who was deported, based on false information, by the U.S. to Syria (he was a dual citizen), where he was apparently tortured. The Bush administration also invoked the state secrets privilege to defeat lawsuits challenging the government’s unlawful FISA surveillance program.

Although judges can order, and have ordered, disclosure of disputed documents and other information to them for in camera screening, too often courts have given inordinate deference to executive branch claims. But the privilege should be treated as qualified, not absolute. A government refusal to allow judicial inspection could be met with forfeiture of the case. Congress could assist the judiciary by holding hearings and drafting legislation clarifying the authority of judges, procedures to be used to adjudicate executive claims of state secrecy, and sanctions to be imposed for the executive branch’s refusal to comply.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Unfortunately, Congress has been at least impartially complicit in this and other presidential “power grabs.” It repeatedly has acquiesced to President Bush’s unilateral actions. It has failed in its constitutional obligation to make the laws and to oversee the executive branch to ensure that the latter properly implements the laws passed by Congress.

Enforcing presidential compliance with the law is not easy, especially since a pattern of executive law-breaking has been established. However, the people—the citizens in whose name this House and the rest of the government act—can and should insist that those elected president, this coming November and in the future, respect the separation of powers and other constitutional limits on their authority.

Taking an oath to “preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States” requires no less.

Moreover, the legislature has many tools at its disposal to promote respect for the nation’s fundamental law. It can enlist the courts, of course. It can use its power to hold oversight hearings, backed by the power to subpoena and hold executive officers in contempt. It can refuse to confirm presidential appointments.

Most fundamental is its power to control appropriations. Congress can shape funding in the relevant area to encourage compliance with the law. Moreover, broader retaliation, though less desirable, is another possibility. For instance, the Reagan administration’s attempt to thwart explicit congressional guidelines over federal contracting led to a vote by this Committee to defund the Office of the Attorney General. A compromise was reached: Congress funded the Attorney General’s Office while the administration complied with the law.

The most important requirement is that Congress treat seriously its responsibility to uphold the Constitution. Neither the Bill of Rights nor the separation of powers are self-enforcing documents or principles. The legislative branch has a critical role to play.

The Constitution creates explicit guarantees for individual liberty and limits on government power out of the recognition that even the best-intentioned public officials working to achieve the most public-spirited aims make mistakes. That surely has been evident during the so-called “Global War on Terror,” in which more than a few innocent people have been not just detained, but also imprisoned and tortured. The Bill of Rights and the separation of powers are not mere technicalities, but essentials of our government and our entire system of ordered liberty.

I know this Committee understands that the president’s quest for intelligence and desire for flexibility, legitimate as they are, should not be allowed to serve as a subterfuge for circumventing constitutional protections for liberty and restrictions on presidential power. U.S. District Court Judge Royce Lamberth, appointed by President Ronald Reagan, has reminded us that, “[w]e have to understand you can fight the war [on terrorism] and lose everything if you have no civil liberties left when you get through fighting the war.”

The temptation to cut constitutional corners is not the province of any one party. Rather, it grows when one party controls both the executive and legislature. Then party comity sometimes overrides institutional differences, as it did most recently between 2001 and 2006.

But our constitutional system, and its commitment to limited government and individual liberty, is based both on a series of explicit guarantees that constrain the use of government authority, and a structure that divides government authority. As such, the separation of powers, with the checks and balances expected to naturally follow, is the bedrock foundation of American constitutional government. It is a foundation clearly in danger of crumbling.

Bob Barr is the Libertarian Party candidate for President and a former member of Congress from Georgia.

And now, John McCain’s new advisor, Michael Goldfarb, is making the claim that the executive branch has “near dictatorial powers”

Read more of what Goldfarb has written at Salon.com:

Mitchell’s less than persuasive answer [to whether withdrawal timetables "somehow infringe on the president's powers as commander in chief?"]: “Congress is a coequal branch of government…the framers did not want to have one branch in charge of the government.”

True enough, but they sought an energetic executive with near dictatorial power in pursuing foreign policy and war. So no, the Constitution does not put Congress on an equal footing with the executive in matters of national security.

Seems that people like Goldfarb are doing a little selective reading. People like Alexander Hamilton clearly wanted a very “energetic” executive branch, but there were many, many others, such as Patrick Henry, James Madison, Thomas Jefferson, etc – who wanted co-equal branches.

The Constitution was written under a simple principle – positive grant. In short, what this means is this: The federal government is authorized to exercise only those powers which are specifically given to it in the Constitution.Everything else is “reserved to the States, respectively, or to the People.”

Period.

The 10th Amendment, for example, makes it quite clear:

“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”

Read more here:

• Why We Have a 10th Amendment
• The Enumerated Powers Act
  
• The Other Founders: The Dissenting Tradition in America

More memos recently have surfaced that were written early in the Bush administration by John C. Yoo from the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel — the man who gave us the administration’s horrifyingly narrow definition of torture. As difficult as it is to believe, the recently released memos are even scarier than the original torture memo.

Yoo boldly asserts that the president’s power during wartime is nearly unlimited. For example, he argues that Congress has no right to pass laws governing the interrogations of enemy combatants and the commander-in-chief can ignore such laws if passed, and can, without constraint, seize oceangoing ships.

The memos also argue that military operations in the United States against terrorists are not subject to the Fourth Amendment requirement for search warrants or the Fifth Amendment requirement for due process.

This broad interpretation of executive power and the president’s commander-in-chief role would make the nation’s founders jump out of their graves. Purposefully, the Constitutional Convention enumerated the large number of Congress’s powers in Article I, and gave most powers related to defense and foreign affairs to the people’s branch.

In particular, the war power was given to Congress. The chief executive, whose powers were enumerated in the much more brief Article II, was given the commander-in-chief role, but this was intended narrowly, only as commander of U.S. troops on the battlefield.

Instead of declaring war, which has fallen out of fashion, the Congress, after 9/11, passed a resolution authorizing the president to go after al-Qaida overseas but deliberately omitted domestic activities from that authorization.

Democrats and Republicans alike declared that they were not endorsing a broad expansion of the president’s authority as commander-in-chief.

An important example from the nation’s infancy shows how narrowly the founders regarded the president’s role as commander-in-chief. During the Quasi-War with France in the last years of the 1700s, Congress authorized President John Adams to seize armed ships sailing to French ports. Adams exceeded the congressional authorization by ordering the seizure of vessels sailing to or from French ports. The Supreme Court, in the case Little v. Barreme, ruled that Adams had exceeded the authority Congress had delegated to him. So much for Bush’s supposed intrinsic authority to seize all oceangoing ships without congressional authorization.

In 1952, President Truman, the first imperial president, seized the steel mills under his alleged “inherent power” as commander in chief — supposedly to prevent paralysis of the national economy and using the rationale that soldiers in the Korean War needed weapons and ammunition.

By a wide margin, in the case Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, the Supreme Court struck down Truman’s executive order to seize the mills because it had no statutory or constitutional basis. Essentially, the court ruled that the president may be commander-in-chief of the armed forces but not the country.

Yoo’s assertion that Congress has no right to pass laws that impinge on the president’s claim to a broad interpretation of his role as commander-in-chief violates the core of the constitutional system of checks and balances, and for which the United States regularly criticizes despots in foreign countries.

Finally, the Fourth Amendment (requiring warrants for any search) and the Fifth Amendment (the right to due legal process) contain no exceptions for wartime. In fact, in a republic — where the rule of law should be king — crises and wartime are exactly when people’s rights are most likely to be endangered and when safeguards are especially needed.

Even more tragic and dangerous than the quagmires of Iraq and Afghanistan have been President Bush’s usurping of power from the other two branches of government and the creation of the “hyperimperial” presidency.

Ivan Eland is Director of the Center on Peace & Liberty at The Independent Institute. Dr. Eland is a graduate of Iowa State University and received an M.B.A. in applied economics and Ph.D. in national security policy from George Washington University. He has been Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, and he spent 15 years working for Congress on national security issues, including stints as an investigator for the House Foreign Affairs Committee and Principal Defense Analyst at the Congressional Budget Office. He is author of the books, The Empire Has No Clothes: U.S. Foreign Policy Exposed, and Putting “Defense” Back into U.S. Defense Policy.

© 2008 – Ivan Eland – All Rights Reserved

What does this mean? Well, it’s quite simple. Under Fast Track, the president has the authority to ignore the will of Congress in negotiating new trade agreements.

We must remember that the US Constitution was written under the principle of “positive grant.” This means that the Federal Government is authorized to exercise only those powers that are specifically given to it by the Constitution. Nothing more and nothing less.

This was so important to the founders that they codified it in law as the 10th Amendment:

“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”

There’s nothing, whatsoever, in the Constitution, which authorizes the president to create, conduct and/or conclude trade deals in this manner. This authority resides with Congress. Period.

Do I trust Congress to do a good job managing trade? Absolutely not. But, the potential for the abuse of power rises in proportion to how few the number of people have that power.

NAFTA is not free trade. It’s never been free trade, and this new push by G.W. isn’t free trade either.

Likewise, it’s not Constitutional. It never has been. And this exercise of raw power by an individual – like Bush is doing and Congress has allowed – has nothing to do with the system of government that was created by the founding fathers.

The war happened because when Bush first indicated his intention to go to war against Iraq, Congress refused to insist on enforcement of Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution. For more than 200 years, this article has spelled out that Congress — not the president — shall have “the power to declare war.”

Because the Constitution cannot be amended by persistent evasion, this constitutional mandate was not erased by the actions of timid Congresses since World War II that allowed eager presidents to start wars in Vietnam and elsewhere without a “declaration” by Congress.

Nor were the feeble, post-factum congressional resolutions of support of the Iraq invasion — in 2001 and 2002 — adequate substitutes for the formal declaration of war demanded by the founding fathers.

This is the essence of the unconstitutionality of the war in Iraq – and of every war American politicians have waged since World War II – the last time there was a Constitutionally-mandated declaration of war.

POSITIVE GRANT

The Constitution was written under the principle of “positive grant.” This means that the federal government is authorized to exercise only those powers which are specifically listed in the Constitution. This was so important to the founding fathers that they codified it in law as the Tenth Amendment:

“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”

As Cuomo made clear, Article I, Section 8 of states that Congress shall have the “power to declare war.” Nowhere in the Constitution is the Congress given authority to transfer that power to any other person or branch. And, nowhere is the president given the power to declare war either.

AUMF. AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL TRANSFER

In 2002, Congress passed the “Authorization to Use Military Force” (AUMF). Although Congress claimed that this legislation “satisfied” the requirements of Article I, Section 8, it did not.

The AUMF was not a declaration of war. It authorized the president to make that decision on his discretion. Thus, the AUMF was a transfer of the war-declaring powers to the excecutive branch – which is clearly not authorized by the Constitution.

In short, what Congress told the president with the passing of the AUMF was “You decide when or if we go to war with Iraq. Just let us know shortly after.”

Therefore, every single member of Congress who voted to transfer this power to the president violated the Constitution. And, the president violated the Constitution by not refusing this illegal transfer of power.

It’s pretty simple. When one branch breaks the law, it’s up to the others to “check” that branch. But, unfortunately, all three branches have been ignoring the plain English of the Constitution for decades.

NO MATTER WHAT

As far as declaring war, James Madison, the “father of the Constitution,” summed it up best:

“The executive has no right, in any case, to decide the question, whether there is or is not cause for declaring war.”

It’s in plain English. No right. In any case.

That even includes a situation where the Congress violates the Constitution and transfers its war-declaring powers to the president.

In any case.

No matter what.

Period.